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Abstract 
Coase’s (1960) famous story of land use conflicts between two farms, 
as generalized in the Coase Theorem, injects into neo-institutional 
economics a potential to overcome the a-spatial limitations of neo-
classical economics and contribute to theorization in planning as a 
science for delineating places for specific purposes, or zoning.  In the 
light of the historical evolution in spatial division of labour and a 
review of the literature on the definitions and meaning of zoning, this 
exploratory interdisciplinary inquiry informed by neo-institutional 
economics, history of surveying and planning, attempts to use the 
corollary of the Coase Theorem, which highlights the significance of 
property boundaries, to explore several boundary scenarios in 
planned zoning that are of policy significance.  They are conflicts of 
                                                          
1 This paper is in memory of the late Professor Derek Robin Diamond. 
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zoning, borderline non-zoning, incomplete zoning, forgotten zones, 
zoning for non-planning, rights-conferring zoning and co-
development zoning.  The transaction cost implications of these 
scenarios are spelled out.  Examples from Europe, China, Australia 
and Americas are cited and elaborated where suitable to illustrate 
specific arguments.  
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Privatization involves the partitioning of this resource among separate users with 
a specific delineation of boundaries (Buchanan 1993: p.1, italics authors’). 
Boundary crossings must be expected to occur, even when property is clearly 
defined, because some persons will seek to obtain differential advantage by 
crossing borders… (Buchanan 1993: p.11, italics authors’). 
Preamble 
Zoning as an ordinary expression and “non-zoning” as a technical 
term mean different things to different readers.  In the United States, 
zoning is an institution that has great social and economic significance 
(Perin 1975).  It is a system enabled by legislation and affirmed as 
constitutional by the Supreme Court in Euclid 2  with respect to 
regulating land use and development beyond common law 
restrictions, and in modifying common law rights.  “Non-zoning,” 
which prevailed in Houston, Texas and as profiled by Siegen (1970), 
went against this norm as a radically unique, but feasible, “private city” 
and “private planning” alternative: a looming paradigm with a 
                                                          
2 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company 1926. See for instance Epstein (1996). 
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Coasian transaction cost connection (Glasze et al 2004; Andersson 
and Moroni 2014) in current planning inquiry. 
On the other hand, “Non-zoning” in England does not refer to 
“private planning,” but is professional planning law terminology  
describing local government development controls, which require 
permission for almost any “change in use” or development.  Upon 
closer analysis, this English “non-zoning” system does not differ much 
from what is formally understood as a zoning system elsewhere. For 
example, it is little different from the system in New South Wales, 
Australia, except that there the Local Environmental Plans provide for 
columns of always permitted and permissible uses, as in a typical U.S. 
zoning regime. 
This monograph seeks to focus attention on the point that the 
spatial delineation of land is fundamental to any spatial division of 
labour in social and economic activities. This is real zoning in its 
broadest generic sense, underlying both private property and state 
planning whether expressly called zoning or otherwise. In this light, 
“non-zoning” in Houston can be better described as “private zoning” 
rather than “private planning” by restrictive covenants. For the latter 
makes sense only because it is based on a hidden framework of state 
zoning in the pattern of subdivision of the original private property 
lots, and by other regulations that serve planning purposes.  Also, 
“non-zoning” in England is, in fact, a bona fide zoning regime, as the 
whole local government area, which clearly delineates jurisdictional 
boundaries, can be regarded as a zone within which the provisions of 
the town planning legislation of the time applies. 
Part 1: Introduction  
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From a historical perspective, the delineation of land with 
planimetrically accurate boundaries for private land ownership, 
whether through a haphazard or gradual process for properties 
possessed from “time immemorial” or according to a state 
subdivision plan for a newly-annexed territory, is an essential prelude 
to the unitization and commodification of properties by lowering the 
transaction costs of valuating the property.  In the latter case, 
planning or zoning by contract can occur ab initio, as in the case of 
many British colonies, where the land was granted subject to state 
planning controls.  Treated as ‘natural’ zones for planning by 
proprietors, these privately-owned land lots were “rezoned” when 
subsequent modern zoning was imposed on them by the state for 
whatever reason. 
This wide understanding of zoning helps evaluate the transaction 
cost implications of several real world scenarios of zoning in relation 
to such recent specific planning phenomena in China as “villages in 
cities” and wider practical concepts such as “takings,” “land 
adjustment,” and the “transfer of development rights”, etc. 
Transaction costs, in the Coasian tradition, refer to costs that cannot 
be captured by a neo-classical production function. In this monograph, 
the focus is on the notion of “clearly defined property rights” in the 
Coase Theorem applied to land in the sense of clearly delineated 
property boundaries (Lai 2007).  The Coase theorem, to be elaborated 
in Part 3, was derived from Coase’s 1960 work (Coase 1960) and its 
farming story of two adjoining pieces of land with clearly delineated 
boundaries3 . With respect to resource allocation of land to cattle 
ranching relative to wheat farming as between these domains, as 
demarcated by the location of the mutually agreed adjustable de 
                                                          
3 This “clearly defined legal boundaries” exhausts the meaning of “clearly defined property rights” 
under the Coase Theorem. For the reason behind this, see Lai (2007: p 350). 
 Progress in Planning 
5 
 
facto common boundary, depends purely on relative prices of farm 
produce and is invariant to the de jure border. In this hypothetical 
world, institutional designs including laws and policies are redundant 
and in any case would not affect resource allocation. This theorem 
assumes that transaction costs are zero. The practical application of 
the theorem lies where such costs are exactly positive, a scenario 
covered by the “corollary of the Coase Theorem,” when institutional 
designs – and precision or otherwise of boundary delineation – are 
significant in resource allocation.    
Zoning is meaningless in the absence of a spatial division of labour 
in production and consumption: a nexus of physical exchange 
manifested in transportation and innovatory and other social 
exchange. These in turn imply mutual dependence and cooperation 
as well as competition and rivalry.  Zoning is therefore to be 
understood as a matter of expediency that facilities such exchange. 
This accordingly calls attention not only to private property owners, 
but also to “stakeholders,” who do not hold land under the law, yet 
who are nonetheless significant in social transactions.  Ignoring this 
results in a narrow view of private property that stresses exclusivity, 
whether as economic “defendability” (Fleischman et al 2014; Acheson 
2015) or “might makes right” (Umbeck 1981), and forsakes the social 
function of private rights; rights contingent on and thus also serving 
the common good. 
 A difficult question raised in this monograph, for those who equate 
legislative or statutory zoning to town planning, is how pre-legislated 
urban or rural development was actually ordered in the United States 
between Lord Shaftesbury’s Board of Plantations’ Grand Modell, as 
followed in the laying out of Philadelphia, and Euclid. Equally, how 
were things ordered in Hong Kong between 1842, when the first sale 
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of leasehold interests was held, and 1939 when a Town Planning 
Ordinance was enacted, with its preamble modelled on Euclid. As 
instruments of planning for these two far apart cities, the town 
layouts were products of the visible hand. This puts into proper 
perspective the insightful work of Li (2014) which argues that the 
techniques of surveying and zoning are modern means (“inscription 
devices and modes of calculation”) to picture land’s “resourcefulness” 
to make it “investible” in the common mind.4  
To shed light on this question, the rest of this monograph is 
organized into 5 parts. Part 2, “the prevalence of zoning”, explains 
that boundary delineation is a characteristic of land as private (or 
more generally exclusive) property. The tension between 
penumbrality and exactitude of zone boundaries, which can be 
denominated in terms of transaction costs, is explained. Part 3 offers 
a Coasian stance on zoning as boundary delineation treated as an 
essential institutional arrangement for land property.  Part 4 is a 
literature review, which shows with reference to textual materials 
that boundary delineation is fundamental in academic and 
professional understanding of zoning; that two fundamental and 
erroneous assumptions about zoning are that it is seen only as a state 
planning method and is always imposed unilaterally by the state; and 
that zone boundaries are treated as decision variables without 
reference to lot boundaries. Part 5 examines 7 scenarios of zoning, 
namely conflicts of zoning; borderline non-zoning; incomplete zoning; 
officially forgotten zones; zoning for non-planning and co-
development zones. Part 6 concludes the monograph and Part 7 is the 
bibliography.  
                                                          
4 The drive to planimetrically correct cadastral maps in USA began as early as the 17 Century. See  
Stilgoe (1976). 
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Part 2: The prevalence of zoning  
As new lands were acquired, a first priority was to survey them. The mapped 
cadastral survey was one of the most powerful instruments available in the 
colonies for allocating the prime resource – land. …He [the land surveyor] was the 
instrument for imposing a whole new economic and spatial order on the 
territory….In the process he usually extinguished pre-colonial land rights…..The 
land surveyor was an explorer, resource appraiser, town planner, delineator of 
routeways, and the shaper of landscapes both urban and rural.” (Home 1997: p.37)  
 
The spatial partition of land, whether by governments or private 
bodies, whether as a result of deliberate planning or other more 
spontaneous arrangements based on ingrained assumptions, 
intuition or experience, is a basic land use planning activity that 
entails decisions on boundary delineation, on their clarity and on their 
maintenance.  As private property, the resultant parcels or “places” – 
as often technically referred to as “lots”, which is the term we shall 
use primarily hereafter – are natural and truly (though seldom so 
called) “zones” or units of planning5 for both their owners and the 
state. Such units have definite, though as we shall note not 
necessarily conceptually precise boundaries often initially traditional, 
although with time - and in the case of the colonization of “new 
continents” - fixed by the state and protected by the law adjudicated 
by the courts. 
 
 At this point it is necessary to pursue a Lockean exercise in ‘clearing 
the ground a little’ (Locke (1959), vol.1, 14) to clarify the terms of this 
discussion. What we may style the ‘unit’ with which discussion of the 
economics of property rights and planning is normally concerned is 
the, ‘place’, ‘plot’ or more technically (in the parlance of practitioners 
in law, real estate, surveying and planning) ‘parcel’ or ‘lot’. 
                                                          
5  These are proprietary units and are not the same as “planning units” in UK planning 
enforcement law. In Rawlings v. Secretary of State for the Environment and Tandridge DC (1980): 
The determination of a “planning unit” was a matter of fact and degree for the decision-taker 
and the occupation and ownership were not conclusive. 
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Conceptually this is a geographically delimited, legally defined 
territorial whole exclusively owned by a single juridical entity, the 
owner or title holder. The delimitation is both legally and 
geographically defined by a ‘boundary’: conceptually a continuous 
Euclidean ‘line’ joining Euclidean ‘points’, each of which is ‘located’ in 
a geodetically defined geographical space by precise survey methods 
though, as we shall see, in practice often something very much less 
abstract: a matter of significance in planning.6 
 
 Whether traditionally respected or formally legally established, 
property boundaries of privately occupied lots can therefore be 
physically represented as lines on maps and by structures (“metes 
and bounds”) on the ground. These boundaries are generally 
honoured de facto, even if the property in question does not have de 
jure status as, for example, with entirely traditional land-holding 
systems. Respect for these de facto boundaries would, in time, gain 
them quasi de jure status if transactions are well-witnessed and 
recorded by a credible organisation. 
 It is probable, though no final determination is possible without the 
historical inquiry that is sadly generally lacking, that this core 
conceptual unit of a ‘lot’ is empirically a derivative, rather than a 
fundamental unit. The evidence is not decisive, but anthropological 
research and subsequent descriptions would suggest that, whilst the 
concept of individual ‘ownership’ – perhaps better ‘accepted more or 
less exclusive use’ – of objects may be in some sense and probably in 
the majority of early societies prior (“this spear is mine”, Veblen 1898-
99), in the case of land, group or communal ownership emerges from 
rather different sources (Demsetz 1967: pp. 350-353, Renger 1995: 
pp. 271-272, Acheson 2015). That is, the core ‘land’ unit the group 
                                                          
6 A Euclidean ‘point’ is defined as ‘that which has no part’ (i.e. dimensionless location) and a ‘line’ 
as ‘breadthless length/extension’, Fitzpatrick, R. (ed) (2009), 6, Definitions 1 & 2. 
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‘owns’ – or ‘uses by acceptance’ – is in some sense (to be elaborated 
below) less conceptually unitary because in practice less 
geographically precisely specified. In other words, communal 
property rights preceded private property rights, which latter fit 
better an economy of greater spatial division of labour. It is a 
‘territory’, or perhaps less tendentiously an ‘area’ with or to which a 
group or community feels it has what we may identify, in 
anachronistically modern terms, as rights of belonging and rights of 
use, but which in those early times often did not have a sharply 
defined boundary either in space or through time.  At this junction, it 
should be noted that though common property with a spatial 
dimension as recognised de jure (as a “regime”) necessarily has 
boundaries (set by communal or private property for itself), no 
partitioning into zones is socially accepted.  
 In the passage of time emerged what has become, though never 
exclusively or universally, the modern private property regime that 
stresses exclusivity. The pivot of change has conventionally been 
pinned to the emergence of the Neolithic Revolution (Bellwood 2004, 
though for a counter-view see Hole 1984). This ‘moment’ has 
generally been taken to represent a historically relatively brief period 
of at most a few millennia during which human society underwent 
radical economic, social and political transformation at the end of 
which a nebulous idea of “our territory” had become conceptually 
“sub-divided” or “partitioned” in the sense of Buchanan (1993) and 
changed into conceptualizations of land holding and ownership that 
are recognizably ancestral to today’s.  
 
 We introduce this matter to distinguish in terms of property 
between the concept of a ‘lot’ and, via the idea of a ‘territory,’ that of 
a ‘zone’. We may say, perhaps somewhat stipulatively, that in 
 Progress in Planning 
10 
 
common usage ‘lots’ may be found in or grouped into ‘zones’ that are 
themselves significant subdivisions of ‘territory’. Within the ‘territory’ 
‘zones’ may have included in them or be used to define or otherwise 
order ‘lots’. But whatever may there be the case, the logical grammar 
we have speculatively outlined does suggest a point of interest to the 
discussion that follows. This is that the concept of a ‘territory’ or ‘area’ 
would appear to include, if somewhat loosely, internal spatial 
differentiations in terms of function that, if we are correct in the 
ontogeny of the idea of the private ownership of land, has 
subsequently carried over via ‘zones’ into the narrower sphere of 
private ‘lots’. 
 
 Following this line of thought, we may postulate a world in which 
we understand ‘our territory/area’ as one divided into ‘spaces’, or 
‘zones’ appropriate to certain sub-groups, functions, etc., as a matter 
of spatial division of labour, later to be further enabled by and 
promoting development of communications links and, derivatively, 
transportation.  For example there may be areas where visitors stay, 
another where animals are corralled, other areas where animals are 
butchered, others where food is stored, yet others where it is 
processed.  
 
 Implicit here, and another point to which we shall revert, are the 
necessary pathways for intercommunication that such zones entail. 
That is, if ‘butchery’ happens here, ‘storage’ here and ‘cooking’ here, 
pathways will spring up that enable us to move the products of 
butchery to store and from store to kitchen. These pathways, 
precisely because we are differentiating space by function, are not 
themselves included in any specific functional space. Rather, they are 
outside the various spaces (or zones) and, by derivation, either do or 
may come to form the divisions that separate zone from zone: in short, 
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they are boundaries. Note, however, that on that analysis a boundary 
formed by a route is markedly different from the sort of Euclidean 
boundary that demarcates a zone. 
  
 At a different conceptual level, ‘our’ space may also be divided into 
‘zones’ for males and others for females; for the dead and for the 
living; for the sacred and for the profane and so on. With a 
subsequent development of concepts of private property carved out 
of ‘our territory/area’ as identifiable ‘lots’, we can now see how they 
may in some sense be subordinate to possibly existing ‘zones’ in 
which some activities or category of person may be de jure or de facto 
allowed and others not. 
 
 Equally, however, that manner of sub-dividing space through which 
a society’s practices come to define and conceptualize spaces by 
‘zoning’ would seem also to have been carried into the sphere of 
private property – the world of the ‘lot’.  Thus within a given private 
space, a ‘lot’, ‘zoning’ also occurs. In time a private space perhaps 
initially crudely divided or not divided at all, comes to reflect the more 
complex conceptualization of space familiar in the public domain. 
Perhaps initially no more complex than ‘outside’ and ‘inside’, later 
comes greater and greater refinement. Where we wash. Where we 
defecate. Where we bury/burn the dead. Where the animals live. 
Where we sleep. Where we eat and so on.  James Metzenbaum (1956), 
who was counsel for the Euclid Village, traced the origin of modern 
zoning to “fire zones” imposed by ordinance to restrict storage of 
gunpowder to outside a town. In a lay person’s language, he 
characterised zoning as such: 
 
“Housekeeping for municipalities is, under zoning, finding an orderliness. Zoning is merely 
keeping the kitchen stove out of the parlor, the bookcase out of the pantry and the dinner 
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table out of the bedroom. It provides that houses shall be built among houses, apartments 
in apartment zones, stores in store zones, and industry in zones set aside for industry.”7 
(Metzenbaum 1956: p.41)  
 
 A final important point that needs to be elucidated, emerging from 
the brief discussion above on pathways, rests on what we perceive to 
be the complex logical grammar of the concept of “zone”. We have 
noted how in the context of modern planning and planning theory 
“zone” is logically dependent on the concept of a boundary and, 
specifically, on the strongly Euclidean understanding of a boundary 
that has emerged from the cadastral surveying on which the whole 
edifice of private property legally rests. However, what is not often 
either noticed or commented on is a quite separate sense of “zone” – 
a usage perhaps most elegantly expressed in the title of the popular 
1950s American TV series “The Twilight Zone” that enjoyed two 
revivals in the 1980s and 2000s.  
 
 This separate sense we identify in terms of ‘penumbrally bounded’. 
That is, a zone that is not reducible to Euclidean coordinates and the 
lines that join them, but one that ineluctably carries with it a sense of 
imprecision and incompleteness: a sense that its limits are not only 
loosely defined and definable, but therefore in principle both elastic 
and moveable.  A zone is somewhere that, at its limits, is by definition 
disputable, though that does not assert that it is therefore necessarily 
disputed. 
                                                          
7 Eloquent and reasonable as this sounds, problems immediately arise when one wonders if a 
bank office or a sandwich bar should be allowed in housing and industrial zones or if flats must 
be zoned separately from houses.  The author was calling for a very conservative use of zoning. 
He concluded, “It is the duty of the lawyer to fight for the preservation of such rights and not to 
permit overly zealous zoning experts who draft ordinances nor obliging Councils who pass them, 
to promulgate legislation which is unreasonable or which unlawfully tends toward the 
divestment of the property owners' constitutional rights.” (p.42) He did not expect that planning 
lawyers would “seek rent” from a highly complicated zoning legislation. 




 The concept of “zone” in modern planning policy is in principle and 
overwhelmingly that of a precisely delineated area within which use, 
style, function or social stratum of the inhabitants may be exactly 
prescribed. However, if this analysis is correct, then any planning zone 
must also always, though less visibly or even invisibly, inhere this 
sense of inexactness and hence disputability.  Given that we are 
necessarily always dealing with public policy, then evidently this 
larger if looser concept of “zone” has significant policy and planning 
implications. Any use of the term “zone” and its variants also carries 
with it the more penumbral meaning.  Despite this, as far as property 
and planning law go, all lot and zone boundaries drawn at any map 
scale are deemed to be certain and exact, with the court as the final 
arbiter in case of disputes among property owners/claimants or 
between the state and these owners. (Lai et al 2015)  
 
 This tension in practice between a core ‘penumbrality’ and a legal 
exactness works both spatially and through time, as we shall see both 
in the lacunae in discussions of zoning in the literature reviewed in 
Part 4 below and when discussing some of the scenarios in Part 5. In 
short, any zoning, whilst aiming for what we might style precise, 
deliberated outcomes (“This here, precise boundary, that there.”), 
also necessarily thereby creates an imprecise, disputable penumbra 
(“This here, imprecise penumbra, that there.”) that has significant 
policy effects.   
 
Figure 1A and Figure 1B about here 
Caption for Figure 1A: Natural, Terrain Following Boundaries with Spatially Inexact Markers 
and with Eastern Boundary Indeterminate 
 
 Progress in Planning 
14 
 
Caption for Figure 1B: The Same Bounded Territory with Superimposed, Surveyed Boundaries 
Rationalizing the Customary Boundaries and Removing the Indeterminacy of the Previous 
“Fuzzy” Eastern Boundary 
 
Figure 1A and Figure 1B shows this world of tension and penumbrality 
with a customary boundary that, once surveyed and brought into the 
world of private property, encircles two ‘lots’ themselves divided by 
a typically rectilinear modern surveyed boundary. The intention is to 
show the original fractal ‘wiggliness’ of the customary boundary as it 
follows the rumpled actuality of the landscape and how boundary 
markers, whether natural like trees, boulders and streams, or artificial 
like drainage channels, road/track or hedge corners, are 
superimposed on this potentially implicitly Euclidean line. Figure 1A 
also shows, in its indeterminate eastern boundary, how customary 
conceptions of space can inhere indeterminacy; an uncertainty as 
where ‘our space’ stops and ‘their space’ begins. We shall revisit this 
thought in Part 5: Scenarios of Zoning. Equally therefore, the two 
diagrams serve to show the lesser, but non-negligible implicit 
penumbrality of the modern, surveyed boundary between the two 
lots precisely because it is that: a boundary. 
 
 Where the outer, customary boundary is concerned, the diagram 
also shows how, from the perspective of surveying and mapping such 
a customary boundary, a cost-efficient chaining (or these days laser 
sighting) ‘straightens’ minor irregularities, such that the 
concatenation of surveyed straight line bounds overlies the fractal 
and chaotically curvilinear actuality. This also indicates a usefulness 
to the scalar mismatch inevitable in any mapping that is not to a scale 
of 1:1, in that the ‘width’ of a mapped boundary serves at least in 
many cases to embrace wiggly actuality by recognizing that the 
surface of the Earth is non-Euclidean.   
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 By contrast the surveyed ‘modern’ boundary is depicted as 
suffering from only one aspect of penumbrality, namely the fuzziness 
resulting from scalar mismatch, where the resulting mapped 
boundary is not a Euclidean widthless and hence indisputable line, but 
a disputable ‘zone’ that, depending on the scale of the survey, more 
or less fuzzily distinguishes lot A from lot B. 
 
Figures 2A and 2B about here 
Caption for Figure 2A: The Coase Theorem 
 
Caption for Figure 2B: The Corollary of the Coase Theorem  
 Taking those general points and applying Coase’s idea about 
property boundaries, Figure 2A and Figure 2B demonstrate the 
question of zone boundary in terms respectively of the Coase 
Theorem (without any penumbra) and the corollary of the Coase 
Theorem (with penumbra) with vague boundaries due to competing 
interpretations of boundary stones/landmarks.  Figure 2A shows a 
scenario without transaction costs in de jure boundary delineation for 
land Lots A and B granted by the state.  Figure 2B shows certain 
domains of A and B with 7 penumbrae over which de jure property 
rights can be uncertain and contested by the state. We may observe 
here an historical trajectory, generated by improvements in the 
technology of survey accuracy, to move from a block boundary 
marker (a stone, a tree…) with its inevitable penumbral 
indeterminacies as depicted in Figure 2B to the modern, zero-point 
marked cadaster that has the specific product of narrowing the 
penumbra towards, though never achieving, Euclidean evanescence, 
as conceptualized in Figure 2A. 
 
 Another way of putting that, referring back to the brief discussion 
of zone divisions formed by pathways above, is to ponder the 
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uncertainty of any such pathway. Is it a pathway within a zone? Or is 
it a pathway between zones? We can mentally map this uncertainty 
by imagining a large space subdivided into zones and within zones 
into lots. Paths join lots within zones. And paths link zones. In both 
cases what matters about the path is that it gives access from any 
lot/zone P to any other lot/zone Q without, as it goes from any P to 
any Q, encroaching on P, Q or any other lot/zone. Evidently such a 
pathway is not itself strictly ‘in’ P or Q but always, in some sense, 
spatially and hence zonally neutral (Jarzombek 2010).  It is often 
classified as a zone on its own as on large-scale plans.   
 
 This may partly explain why there is an observable tendency for 
zonal planning to be done on small scale maps. By definition any line 
on a small scale map covers a swathe of territory, not a precise bound, 
thus creating an undefined spatial void (in effect hidden borderline 
areas or zones) running along the border lines, which are intended to 
segregate uses on either sides of them: “Somewhere between here 
and there we stop permitting this and start permitting that”, or more 
generally, allowing for non-planned planning, “This gradually turns 
into that over this intervening tract of territory.” With the implicit 
rider, “Once we’ve firmed up the plan we’ll start turning gradual into 
exact.” That this is not an outlandish approach to zoning can be 
readily appreciated if we consider the unacceptable (but sadly 
common) ideas of zoning by ethnicity, caste, occupation or social class 
and the inevitable human tragedies that ensue, especially at the 
extreme in crimes against humanity like ethnic cleansing.   
 
 The costs arising from the tension between the penumbrality and 
exactitude of zone boundaries are not costs of production and 
therefore Coasian transaction costs. This provides a map scale 
explanation, as a matter of transaction costs, which adds to the usual 
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information cost constraint problem (the state’s information 
ignorance about the operation of private enterprises as land users) 
advanced against top-down interventionist government state 
planning. Namely the conflict between government plans and private 
property rights.  The fact is that the government planner seldom 
proceeds, as the development market works, bottom up from 
individual property lots where the result is the production of a plan 
that has its foundation (“base map”) resting on a composite of large 
scale8 plans each designed for an individual lot.   
 
 The digital revolution has reduced the transaction costs that once 
prohibited a bottom up planning approach respectful of property 
boundaries. It also avoids the scenarios of “conflict of zoning” and 
“borderline non-zoning” to be mentioned later.  Transaction costs, in 
neo-institutional economics, refer to costs that cannot be captured 
by the neo-classical production function. In other words, they cover 
costs of information, time, contracting and political bargaining, and 
dishonesty, etc. Douglass North estimated that more than 70% of the 
GNP of the USA is made up of such costs.  Neo-institutional 
economists, following the teaching of the late Ronald Coase (1910-
2013), 1991 Nobel laureate in economic science, consider that 
institutional arrangements affect these costs. As elaborated in Part 3, 
zoning is just such an important institutional arrangement.  
  
 We would argue that a thoughtful look at pre-rationally planned 
urban and rural areas would more often than not show exactly the 
sort of “this use, mixed use that use” pattern we should expect 
supposedly “unplanned” societies and economies to exhibit. In short, 
the very concept of a “zone” is one that marches uncomfortably with 
                                                          
8 Say 1:600 to 1:1000. 
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the concept of a “lot” or “parcel”.  Lots or parcels are precisely 
delineated. They are ownable and tradable, however that trade may 
be effected. On this analysis, because of their penumbrality9, “zones” 
are in an important sense beyond the market, despite their significant 
effects on private property rights, especially the more ineluctable 
effects occasioned by penumbrality on market activity. As we shall 
see in the scenario we have labeled “forgotten zones”, it is precisely 
this quality of a “zone” that is too often and too easily neglected. 
   
 It follows from this highly general and conceptual discussion that 
the tightly defined ‘physical space’, in which the creation of property 
and the activity of planning locate, must always also be read in terms 
of other conceptualizations of space (Thrift 2003). These, like Thrift’s 
‘unblocking, ‘image’ and ‘place’ spaces are less easily confined by the 
exigencies of cadastral controls. 
 
 
Part 3. A Coasian stance on zoning as a matter of boundary 
delineation 
 
One of the neglected contributions to the spatial dimension of 
planning by Coase is the idea that subsequent adjustments in the 
boundaries of these spatial units by the state or a private entity are 
best conducted by mutual consent. The rationale is that this incurs 
much lower transaction costs in dispute resolution and less political 
resistance than achieving the same end by order. For example 
interventionist state planning, which often ignores, denies, or 
overrides private property (“lot”) boundaries without compensation, 
is frequently not only resented but actively resisted.  We may say that 
                                                          
9 The argument here does not contradict the position of Walker and Peters (2001) that many so-
called “blurred boundaries” are in fact disputes over “clear and distinct” meanings of boundaries.  
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dispute resolution between private lot holders is 
penubrality/uncertainty sensitive in a way that more formal 
regulatory systems are not, given that the penumbrality/uncertainty 
is generated by micro-level information, time, bargaining, honesty, 
etc.: costs of which the rights holders are aware in a way that the 
more ‘one size fits all’ approach of state regulation is not.  
 
 Coase’s idea is encapsulated in a farming parable involving a 
conflict between two land uses by two adjoining farms. This was 
resolved by private agreement to adjust the ratio of land devoted to 
the two uses by altering the de facto boundary and so areas for the 
two uses. That is, there was an adjustment to the common land 
boundary by the mutual consent of both parties to the conflict. The 
late George Stigler (1911-1991), Coase’s colleague and fellow Nobel 
laureate (1982), generalised this hypothetical example of resolving 
conflicts of interests between two producers to reach win-win 
solutions that maximises joint value output through the private 
exchange of rights under different market conditions for the products 
into the so-called Coase Theorem.  The exchange of rights solution is 
often described as a free market or contractual solution (i.e., one 
devoid of express spatial referents).   
 
 Stigler formulated two versions of the Theorem.  The first is called 
the invariant theorem.  It may be stated as: “given zero transaction 
costs and clearly delineated property rights, institutional 
arrangements do not affect resource allocation.”  The other is the 
optimality theorem: “given zero transaction costs and clearly 
delineated property rights, resource allocation is Paretian efficient.”  
The land boundary dimension of the parable or of the theorem itself 
has been missed by many friends and foes of the Coase Theorem, 
including Stigler, because they focused on the validity of the 
assumptions of “zero transaction costs” and “clearly defined property 
rights,” with the latter treated a-spatially, forgetting that the parable 
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involves a necessary initial delineation of the farms’ de jure 
boundaries and subsequent adjustment in the de facto boundaries of 
land devoted to the two specialized land uses. 
 
 Probably due to Coase’s background as an economist and this 
important work’s appearance in the Journal of Law and Economics, 
the Coase Theorem has become best known in the economic and legal 
fields.  However, by virtue of the fact that the conflict of interest in 
Coase’s imaginary story was actually a land use conflict – one between 
wheat cultivation and cattle grazing – the Coase Theorem is, more 
rightfully speaking, a land use planning theorem with a modern land 
surveying and Grand Modell (see below) lot delineation (visible hand) 
foundation. The heart of Coase’s parable is the partitioning (zoning) 
of ranching and wheat planting and the key fact is that the conflict 
resolution involved an essential spatial element that contrasted with 
government planning, More precisely, the Coase theorem is a land 
use zoning theorem because the spatial delineation of land is an 
essential element of land use planning, as we have considered that 
issue in our introductory discussion above. This would appear always 
at some level to have been the case as this monograph will now 
further explain. 
At this juncture, it must be pointed out noted that economic 
theorization of urban development 10  has ignored the spatial 
boundary dimension of land, treating it as a factor input (especially 
fertility), a quantum of area or points along a time line or ruler.   This 
a-spatial treatment of land becomes more problematic, when land is 
dealt with as a matter of property rights, when land boundary 
delineation is treated as a given parameter rather than a decision 
variable.  In the story of Coase as encapsulated in the aforesaid 
Invariant Theorem, the initial and subsequent locations of boundaries 
                                                          
10 The importance of boundaries is better recognized in environmental economics research. See 
for instance Fleischman et al (2014); Acheson (2015); and Yin et al (2013).  
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are decision variables.  Good exceptions are the work of Allen (1991) 
on American homesteading based on grids; the comparative study by 
Libecap and Leuck (2011a) on metes and bounds vis-a-vis grids in Ohio; 
and the study by Libecap et al (2011b) on the choice of private lot 
boundary types in several common law jurisdictions.  The papers of 
Libecap and his collaborators, written from a choice-theoretical 
perspective typical of neo-institutional economics, were informed by 
the detailed historical and map analysis of Price (1995), which is 
indispensable for any planning student serious about modern zoning 
by legislation or contract.  
Price (1995) presented various patterns of land as that was first 
sub-divided into lots for the first settlers in the thirteen British and 
the French colonies in America. The origin of these patterns, which 
vary between ribbon shaped “longlots” (also known as “ribbon lots” 
or “elongated lots”); grid type parcels; polygonal lots that averaged 8 
sides; and irregular metes and bounds allocations can be traced to 
earlier European home-country experiences. Given that, it would not 
be an exaggeration to argue (from a choice theoretic stance of the 
neo-institutional economist) that the adoption or “choice” of each of 
these patterns was the first significant planning act of the colonial 
administration. And it was so by virtue of the fact that from the outset 
the land over which generations of indigenous tribes had roamed and 
had defended as communal property was treated as common 
property.   
Subsequent development, in the jargon of economists, has 
been “path-dependent.”  The landmark work of Home (1997), which 
does not cross reference Price (1995), traces the origin of British town 
and country “master” planning for colonies to the Board of 
Plantations, which became the Colonial Office, and more specifically 
to the so-called “Grand Modell” of Lord Shaftsbury, and a series of 
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legal enactments for colonies notably the ‘Act of Building a Towne’ of 
1662.   
The Modell had its origins in “the bastide towns of medieval 
Europe, (in) Renaissance and Baroque revival of ancient Roman 
planning, to the Spanish Laws of the Indies and even to a seventeenth 
century plan of Peking.” (Home 1997:p. 8) Home concluded that this 
model, as applied with modifications, is one with a number of 
characteristics. Deliberate urbanization to avoid dispersed 
settlement. Differentiation among town, suburban and country (farm) 
lots. “The town planned and laid out in advance of settlement.” Wide 
streets laid out in geometric, usually grid-iron form, usually an area 
of “one square mile.” “Standard-size rectangular plots.” Public 
squares. Lots reserved for public purposes. And “buffering town and 
country by a greenbelt or common land.” (Home 1997: p.9, 
Underlining authors’) The Modell, was applied in modified manner to 
suit local conditions. 
In layman’s terms, as Price summarized the matter, “Whatever 
their form, landownership (cadastral) patterns are among the most 
persistent features of the human landscape.” (Price 1995: p.6)  The 
rigidities of these patterns in shaping landscape, easily discerned in 
any aerial photograph and demonstrated in Figure 3, which shows the 
correspondence between modern roads and the boundaries of Lot 2 
in the Lot Plan for Perth (Welshpool area) laid down by Surveyor 
General John Septimus Roe, puts into proper context London 
architect Cedric Price’s witty three-egg-recipe account of urban 
transition. It moves from boiled eggs with solid and smooth outlines 
with a definitive yolk, via a fried egg the outer edge of which breaks 
up into fractal chaos but still with a distinctly bounded yolk, to 
scrambled eggs without any clear prime centroid or tidy fringes. Town 
planners in both public service and private practice certainly are 
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accustomed to impose an order, invariably hierarchical, onto the 
urban mosaic presented to them as the “base (map) scenario”. 
Figure 3 about here 
Caption for Figure 3: The Road Map of Lot 2 of Perth 
Of course the ‘shape’ of even the most coherent fortified Roman 
or medieval city was never the neat ‘boiled egg’ it was mapped as 
being. Lean-tos and ‘illegal structures’ within the urban area that 
invaded the yolk’s space did not appear. Shacks abutting the outer 
walls were ignored. Shanties straggling out along approach roads 
were at least conceptually cleared. It was a happy joke in an atlas 
design office in which one of the authors once worked that atlas 
designers had the power to make rivers straighter or wigglier, roads 
more direct, coastlines less chaotic, borders more exact and 
straighter. That is the inevitable consequence of the scalar mismatch 
between a conventional sign (built up area, road, railway, river, 
boundary) and the map of which it is a part. Were the road or pier to 
be to-scale, save on maps of the largest scale (1:600 in the past before 
metrication and 1:1000 now for example), they would be invisible.  
For the leased New Territories in Hong Kong, from 1899 to 1903 
the colonial government carried out a cadastral survey of settled land 
divided into 477 Demarcation Districts (DD) of about 200 acres each, 
with the help of surveyors seconded from British India. For each DD, 
one to-scale “Demarcation District Sheet” (“DD sheet”), combining 
cadastral and topographical details drawn to a scale of 1:1980 with 
numbered lot holdings, was prepared and a Block Crown Lease (BCL) 
issued in 1905.  The inked boundary line itself, when scaled to on-the-
ground size, measured about 1 metre in width. In 2015, the average 
property price for a residential unit in Hong Kong was more than 
HKS100,000 per square foot. It follows that a metre of boundary, 
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approximately ten square feet, was HK$1 million’s worth of 
disputable terrain! 
Purely theoretically, therefore, it is obvious that a boundary, 
that Euclidean object, should never be visible at any scale. It is the 
perfect and complete line of division between two exclusive spheres 
of private ownership over which disputation is in principle impossible. 
Sadly, as a moment’s thought suggests, such absolute precision must 
stumble into Mandelbrot’s fractal world and the assiduous map-
maker and planner, resolved on cadastral clarity, could only settle, 
with Borgesian resolve, for a scale of 1:1 (Mandelbrot 1982, Borges 
1975). 
“. . . In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of a single 
Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, the entirety of a Province. 
In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck 
a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point 
with it.”11 
To set the scene Figure 4A is basically the same as Figure 2A but 
the privately negotiable area between the owner of Lots A and B is 
depicted.  This area is neatly delineated by the de jure perimeter of 
the two pieces of land. There is no need for any court or bureaucratic 
assistance or direction in delimiting the de jure boundary to facilitate 
an exchange of rights (how much land is leased to/from the other 
party).  Figure 4B is identical to Figure 2B showing areas over which 
owners of Lots A and B can negotiate with certitude in the absence of 
any court or bureaucratic (state) assistance or direction in delimiting 
the de facto boundary upon exchange of rights. Figure 4C is what 
follows from that shown in Figure 4B upon court or state 
determination of the common de jure boundary. The joint area of Lots 
                                                          
11 In Borgesian fashion this is offered as a quotation from the seemingly actual but in fact entirely 
fictional Suarez Miranda, Viejas de varones prudentes, Libro IV, Cap. XLV, Lerida, 1658.  
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A and B that can be privately negotiated is smaller than that in Figure 
4A due to six penumbrae. 
Figures 4A, 4B and 4C about here 
Caption for Figure 4A: The Coase Theorem in Action 
 
Caption for Figure 4B: The Corollary of the Coase Theorem in Action (without determination 
of common boundary) 
 
Caption for Figure 4C: The Corollary of the Coase Theorem in Action (with state/court 
determination of common boundary) 
The interesting question is therefore one about the role of maps 
in the planning process and the extent to which planners are 
conscious of any map’s inherent and indelible limitations as a 
depiction of reality. Is the planner in charge of the map or the map in 
charge of the planner?  
There is a cognate slippage between walking and measuring the 
bounds of a property. On the one hand is the property owner’s 
inescapable awareness of the unevenness of the land surface, the 
kinks and jumps made around boulders, over ditches, etc. On the 
other is the surveyor’s apprehension of the importance of distilling 
that natural fractal 12  eccentricity into the scaled clarity of a two-
dimensional rendering for the purposes of legal title and planning. For 
the property owner and the local cadastral surveyor, perhaps there is 
always a healthy sense of the mismatches between map and reality. 
The gap expresses the transaction costs of information.  But at more 
and more removes - land registrar, district planner, regional planner, 
national planner - the two dimensional depiction more and more 
                                                          
12 The key point about fractals is that they are dimensionally inexact – typically fractal dimensions 
would number something like 1.3785439, never exactly two or exactly three. This has obvious 
reference to the whole business of planning and its supposition of the exactness of 
dimensionality. 
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becomes the reality to which, willy-nilly, the rumpled fractal surface 
of the Earth is obliged to conform. 
 Probably influenced by Chicago School rationalist-empiricism, 
geographer Price (1995: p.345), having discussed whether American 
experience was one of adaptation of European traits or a novelty, 
concluded that the “diversity of land division behaviour among the 
colonies enhanced the experimental nature of the land parceling in 
each colony.” The economist certainly favours this “choice” approach.  
Assuming that approach applies, the question that then arises is 
whether we are considering ‘informed choice’, ‘arbitrary choice’, or 
‘prejudiced choice’ (i.e. choice informed by unquestioned 
assumptions, patronage, etc.) or truly instrumentalist working 
assumptions? 
The history of the opening up of the Swan River Settlement by 
the enterprising British naval officer James Stirling is illustrative of a 
conscious design story, no less impressive than the better known 
story of the planning of Adelaide by Colonel Light13.  In the planning 
of this new colony claimed as British, Stirling chose to locate the 
capital town not in Fremantle, the port at the mouth of River Swan, 
but 10 miles upstream near Point Frazer, i.e. today’s Perth City. 
(Statham-Drew 2004)  This choice was based on the military security 
interest in locating the capital out of reach of bombardment by 
enemy war ships of the era. This concern was due to Stirling’s naval 
experience in America during the War of 1812.   Surveyor General 
John Septimus Roe, recruited by Stirling, devised a pattern of farm 
lots each with one end fronting onto a river for ease of transportation. 
As riparian access was scarce due to the number of grantees, these 
lots were all narrow “ribbon lots” or “elongated lots” (Stratham-Drew 
2004: p.32), like those in French colonies which adopted the “arpent 
system” (Johnson 1974, Price 1995, Manning and Bekkering 2015).  
                                                          
13 See Home (1997: pp. 26-29). 
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Perth as a town itself was laid out by Roe according to a grid pattern, 
said by some commentators to follow prevailing Western style as with 
Williamsburg in the USA (Statham 1990) or Edinburgh new town 
(Proudfoot 1990). It is interesting that no commentator chose the 
early14 British colonial military cantonment (Edwards, 1992) as the 
possible model, since this is by far the most probable source. In any 
event, surveyors were prominent in the planning and/or mapping of 
land grants. Before Roe, a good example would be Surveyor General 
Thomas Holme, who mapped land allocations in Pennsylvania.   
Indeed this congeries of colonial experiences is an area of 
planning history that has been too little explored. For implicit in it are 
two or possibly three imperatives entailed in what would have been 
a contemporary idea of planning: imperatives we would argue that in 
turn entail clear ideas of zoning. There would be two ‘metazones’. 
This would roughly differentiate the “occupied centre” 
metazone (the defended/defensible colonial township) from the 
“occupiable periphery” metazone (the colonizable land) - in modern 
planning terminology “buffer zone” - perhaps, depending on the 
nature of the specific colonization, accommodating some or all of any 
existing occupation/land use by indigenous inhabitants.  
In the case of the growth in size of colonial Hong Kong, Hong 
Kong IsIand and Kowloon Peninsula, ceded by China in 1843 and 1860 
respectively, constituted the “occupied centre” (with some tensions 
generated by inhabited villages at the time of occupation) while the 
New Territories, leased from China in 1898, was the “occupiable 
periphery” metazone.  The differentiation, respecting topographical 
features, manifested itself militarily in the construction of the 
Anderson Line (Weir 2012) and Gin Drinker’s Line (Lai et al 2009) 
across the Kowloon Range that forms the contact belt between the 
                                                          
14 Home (1997: pp. 31) shows an example of the plan for Khartoum City but that was an early 
20th century product. 
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two zones in anticipation of an enemy from the north: the enemy that 
arrived in December 1941.   It is here, we might interject at this point, 
that one of our scenarios later to be discussed, the scenario of 
“forgotten zones” begins one of its most characteristic interventions 
in planning. 
With the metazones established, focus shifts to zoning WITHIN 
the metazones. It is here that British colonial practice seems to have 
turned to some highly variable patterns, much hinging on how much 
the exercise was predicated on established British customary land use 
– one thinks here of the earliest settlement patterns in New England 
and the Virginia/Maryland areas (Price 1995) or, alternatively, on a 
more ‘rational’, post Age of Reason set of understandings of the sort 
one finds in such early to mid-19th century examples as Western 
Australia and, though in this case much affected by the exigencies of 
topography, Hong Kong. 
Within the metazones, and most particularly within the 
occupied centre a different set of imperatives could be argued to have 
come into play. They can be theorized as having three “planning” 
dimensions that can be abbreviated as “segregation” of the rulers 
from the ruled; “control” by the rulers of the ruled and less obviously 
of the ruled by themselves; and “security” from the potential range 
of enemies both natural and social – i.e. disease and weather on the 
one hand and riot, mutiny or attack on the other.   
Out of those considerations emerged the actual pattern of 
private property boundaries we can observe in any British colonial 
society, and from that initial set of actual boundaries would 
subsequently emerge, as discussed below, the patterns we can 
observe today and, perhaps, therefore the core inputs to modern, 
zone based planning of the ex-colonies. 
 Progress in Planning 
29 
 
How private property boundaries have shaped and/or have 
been affected by subsequent modern zoning imposed on/across 
them is therefore a fertile area for Coasian empirical research.  For 
example the old subdivision plans, especially for laying out 
agricultural lots, probably strike the modern planning student by their 
absence of delineation of any public road. There are two reasons for 
this. The first, where we are dealing with the layout of lots in newly 
colonized territory, is the absence of any long-established traditional 
tracks and paths that, in the established metropolitan societies, 
provided at least some ‘natural’ boundary lines. In short, the 
development of pathways noted above has not begun because there 
are none of the necessary relationships between lot holders. The 
second reason, directly related to the seemingly ‘undeveloped’ 
nature of the land as far as the movement of people and goods were 
concerned, was the dependence, in an era before the steam engine 
or internal combustion engine, on mainly maritime and riverine 
transport links.  
The reach of the invisible hand of the market was shortened and 
the hand of the state suddenly stretched further and deeper in light 
of two pertinent questions that resulted from changes to these initial 
scenarios. First, how were railways and highways, as in themselves 
planned ‘zones’ for use by the general public, eventually to cut across 
side by side private lots if such routes were beyond what restrictive 
covenants among individual private lot owners could afford? Second, 
how were elongated lots (such as those along Swan River in Western 
Australia) to become widened to adapt to new modes of land use and 
transport? The answers likely involved voluntary surrender and re-
grant of private lots as well as exercise of the prerogative of the state 
to take land.  Subdivision plans for town lots and modern suburban 
subdivision plans always provide for roads and community places, 
which, like the tracks and paths of yesteryear, often delimit the 
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boundaries of private lots or serve as convenient mental boundaries 
for ethnic zones that naturally emerge.15  
This monograph holds that the real world situation of positive 
(actually rampant) transaction costs actually renders the delineation 
of the boundaries of private property (‘lots’ contained in private 
zones) and those of any declared planning zones (public zones in 
government or public space, with its indelible penumbrality) 
extremely important in affecting the efficiency, if not also the equity, 
of land resource use.  This assertion is demonstrated by several 
scenarios of what we shall collectively style ‘zoning boundaries’.  
There are seven that we have identified. These are scenarios of 
conflicts of zoning; borderline non-zoning; incomplete zoning; 
forgotten zones; zoning for non-planning; rights-conferring zoning 
and co-development zoning within the context of the Common Law 
that prevails in the English-speaking world. We shall elaborate on the 
details of these seven scenarios in Part 5 below. 
 That set of demonstrations, supported by real world examples, 
does not offer a mere typology. Rather, by considering zoning as a 
spatial activity informed by neo-institutional economics, it suggests 
starting points for further research with policy significance.  The 
zoning scenarios discussed below, as problems of boundary 
delineation by the state, pertain to the libertarian challenge to 
interventionist zoning, the primeval need for state involvement in 
private property matters, issues in universal human values, and 
conflict resolution. 
To appreciate this proposition, there is a need to examine how 
zoning is understood and defined by scholars and practitioners who 
may or may not have any knowledge or interest in Coasian economics 
                                                          
15 Hassan (2009) held that ethnic zoning in George Town, delineated by roads, was a policy rather 
than a spontaneous phenomenon.     
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or the complex conceptual relationships entailed in our spatial 
language. 
 
Part 4: Impossibility of land use planning without zoning: a literature 
review 
The meaning of planning has been much debated, but the meaning of 
zoning has not.  It is well accepted that zoning is a known and 
established means of land use planning. However, that urban 
planning always involves zoning needs some elaboration.  Most 
studies on zoning do not define the term and simply proceed to 
discuss its social or economic implications.  Consider, for instance, the 
works of Matjiya (2009) and Crowell (1931): 
In its historical form, zoning was about exclusion.  The protection of residential land uses 
from industrial and commercial uses, the imposition of density and bulk limits on buildings 
to prevent overcrowding, congestion, lack of light and air…It is clear that under the zoning 
concept the protection of single family residential use was of utmost importance (Matjiya 
2009: p.24). 
Zoning is the application of common sense and fairness to the public regulations governing 
the use of private real estate (Crowell 1931: p.326). 
While these examples, given their specific objectives, did not need to 
dwell on the precise meaning of zoning, 16  any endeavour to 
reinterpret planning as a concept for theoretical articulation should 
attract careful scrutiny. 
 To make the subsequent discussion clearer, and building on the 
general discussion in Parts 1, 2 and 3 above, we need here arbitrarily 
to distinguish two senses in which the term ‘zone’ and its grammatical 
variants appear to be used. On the one hand ‘zone’ is used to describe 
a non-formal, ad hoc achievement of some shared quality 
                                                          
16 Unlike the work by Bassett (1924), which, despite its title, did not address the meaning of 
zoning at all. 
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characterized by every built feature within a land area. That is, a ‘zone’ 
of farms, private residential houses, leatherworkers’ shops, or 
whatever, that has emerged as a simple function of time and shared 
practices. On the other hand there is the sense of ‘zone’ as a goal of 
prescriptive or deliberate planning in which common attributes of 
buildings within a ‘zone’ are products of formal, declared and explicit 
requirements. 
In both senses land use planning without zoning is inconceivable. 
Indeed, following our introductory remarks, we would argue that the 
first sense of zoning is logically prior.  To the best of the authors’ 
knowledge, there is no work suggesting that urban planning exists 
without zoning in this former sense. ‘Zones’ of private property 
(parcels or lots) with shared attributes, for example, were a common 
feature of places before ideas of formal urban planning were 
developed.   
The mistaken belief that there may be urban planning without 
zoning is therefore likely due to the fact that there exists an officially 
“non-zoning” development control system in Britain and also perhaps 
to the famous paper on “Non-zoning in Houston” by Professor 
Bernard Siegan (1970).  Upon our closer analysis of the meaning of 
zoning, neither English planning nor the Houston system is really un-
zoned.  This is also revealed by the review of the literature on planning 
and zoning that follows.  Some of the works specifically try to explain 
the nature of zoning or zoning provisions. Others only provide passing 
references to the concept. But zoning in one or other sense is 
everywhere apparent. 
The human mind understands reality by abstractions and 
dichotomies are important forms of abstraction.  Some dichotomies 
are real, but many are not.  In land planning in the abstract two 
dichotomies that are commonly, if as we shall see mistakenly noted 
are of utmost significance, as they shape theorization and policy 
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decisions, matters that are both practical and important.  The 
dichotomies are between planning and the market and between 
zoning and non-zoning.  It is highly tempting to assume these are two 
ways of making the same distinction by drawing parallels between 
planning and zoning on the one hand and non-zoning and the market 
on the other.  Suffice it to say that the first dichotomy is not one 
because ‘market’ and ‘plan’ occupy logically distinct category spaces, 
which is not to say there are no difficulties in reconciling the market 
and any plan. The second however is a genuine dichotomy: the 
opposite of zoning is the absence of it (i.e., non-zoning).  However, 
this may prove to be where logic (the world of abstract categories) 
parts company with actuality (the real material world), for following 
our two senses of the word ‘zone’ above, what we may think to be a 
case of non-zoning may actually be a zoning case in disguise. 
One certainly cannot assert that a place is un-zoned simply 
because there is no official document called a zoning plan or map; the 
expression, “zoning,” is not mentioned;17 or, more subtly, because 
there is no legislation that expressly describes “zoning”.  Even if 
legislation does not expressly call its control of land use and/or built 
form (as in the case of subdivisions and building codes) ‘zoning’, 
zoning is unquestionably the result.  Similarly, without the word ever 
having appeared anywhere, agreement between property owners 
can result in a state of affairs that is indisputably ‘zoning’.  Above all, 
zoning of some sort is always inherent in any land tenure that is not 
de jure common and de facto open access 18  by virtue of the 
                                                          
17 A good illustration is the UK Town and Country Planning Act of 1947.  As Burke and Taylor (1990) 
pointed out, “Although the term ‘zoning’ was not mentioned in the legislation...the principle (of 
zoning) gained acceptance and the allocation of uses and densities became the recognised means 
of control of land use in planning under the 1947 Act system” (Burke and Taylor 1990: p.43, 
brackets authors’). 
18 Many economists confuse common property with open access property. The former is a de 
jure status, the later de facto access control. (Lai and Ho 2014) Private property, notably that of 
the state, is often open access due to either the high transaction costs of enforcing exclusion or 
to deliberate social concerns. One may say that even de jure common property is ‘zoned’ in two 
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delimitation of property rights along the spatial dimension.  This last 
point is of paramount importance, as it has resource allocation, 
conservation, and transformation implications because it elevates the 
entire discussion beyond a taxonomic exercise in the understanding 
and evaluation of alternative modes of zoning in terms of property 
rights. 
Definitions of zoning in the literature 
What, precisely, is zoning?  A good starting point for structuring 
a review is Professor Patrick Abercrombie’s famous textbook, Town 
and Country Planning, which gave a succinct definition of it: 
Zoning is the dedication of a certain area to a certain use (Abercrombie 1933: p.139). 
Abercrombie’s definition had two basic elements: (a) dedication of a 
specified area of land to a use and (b) the certain use to which it is to 
be dedicated.  Element (a) entails the apportionment, delineation, 
demarcation, carving out, dedication, or encircling of land to create a 
“zone” or “district”.  A ‘use’ is generally functional (farming, light 
industry, residential) but often related to, if not identified as, a certain 
form of building (barns, factories, houses).  In the UK, this was the 
advice of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning handbook, The 
Redevelopment of Central Areas. 
This advocated, inter alia, that buildings with similar siting requirements should be grouped 
together while those with conflicting requirements should not be grouped together.  The 
plan for development or redevelopment of a town should therefore provide for its division 
into a number of “use zones” each of which would be designed and equipped to provide sites 
suitable for the particular category of buildings” (Burke and Taylor 1990: p.43). 
                                                          
senses. First, in the obvious sense that the open access common property (say the public ocean) 
is itself ‘zoned’ by private property (coastal water zone boundaries). That is, this is a zone where 
anything and anyone goes without let or hindrance. Second, within an open access common 
property domain, zoning MAY occur precisely on the arguments advanced by non-zoning 
adherents to rebut any planning. Accordingly that zoning may be either temporal (it is autumn, 
the beech mast is on the ground, now is the time for pigs) or spatial/functional (sheep here, cows 
there (where sheep graze cattle can’t, the grass is too short). 
 Progress in Planning 
35 
 
Fischel’s (1985) classic text, The Economics of Zoning Law, defined 
zoning more or less in the same way as Abercrombie: 
Zoning is the division of a community into districts or zones in which certain activities are 
prohibited and others are permitted (Fischel 1985: p.21). 
Professor Gordon Cherry (1996) had a similar definition:  
The actual practice of town and country planning was securing a more technical base (during 
the period 1909 to 1930) as the principle of “zoning” was taken up, whereby “areas in which 
certain types of developments would be allowed were delineated as land use parcels in 
scheme layouts.  (Cherry 1996: p.70; italics authors’.) 
The same is true of Heikklia (2000), who described zoning maps as 
follows: 
Zoning maps apportion the city into distinct zones, each of which has its own sets of 
permitted uses (Heikklia 2000: p.25). 
In research papers and professional publications, there are 
basically three types of definitions, one of which does not expressly 
mention element (a) of Abercrombie’s aforesaid definition, another 
that expressly mentions both (a) and (b), and a third that mentions 
neither (a) nor (b).  The best example of the first group is the work by 
Lai (1997) and the review by Hirt (2012) on zoning.  Although Lai’s 
work treated zoning as a means to constrain rent dissipation and 
handle externalities, it defined zoning broadly and pinned it down as 
“boundary delineation” (Lai 1997: p.199).  Hirt elaborated on it in the 
same vein: 
…far from being universal, zoning (at least the type of land-use zoning routinely applied in 
the United States) is not practiced in Europe… (Hirt 2012: p.376). 
A dictionary definition of the word ‘‘zone’’ is of little help.  To zone is to merely carve an area, 
region, or district out of a larger whole.  Zoning, therefore, is simply delimiting a territory or 
dividing it into smaller components (Hirt 2012: p.376, italics authors’). 
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Carving out an area was the emphasis of Hirt’s definition.  Specifying 
land uses or activities was not essential.  An earlier example in the 
same vein was provided by Skorburg (2008): 
“What is zoning?”  Zoning uses government power to create boundaries between land uses.  
It is illegal to zone via income, but not illegal to create minimum size lots – to lead to the 
same ultimate end.  MLS (minimum lot size) encourages higher value houses and reduces the 
value of unimproved land where town stratification by income can result.  Zoning increases 
land rents for the restricted sector and lowers rents for the poorer areas and can lead to area 
segregation (Skorburg 2008, italics authors’). 
Although Skorburg mentioned land uses, he gave no express 
requirement that such uses were prescribed or controlled, though he 
indicated the idea of restriction. 
The second type of definition forms a much larger group and is 
typically generated by formal legal research, planning, public and 
professional bodies, and planning theorists.  One example of legal 
research that offered a definition of zoning is the work of Borgan 
(1956-57): 
“What is zoning?  In general, zoning is the division of a designated area into districts for the 
purpose of regulating the present and future use, construction, and location of buildings and 
the use of land” per Rathkopf, I. (1956), The Law of Zoning and Planning 2 (Borgan 1956-57: 
p.507, italics authors’). 
Another example is Polsky (1975): 
Zoning has been defined as: 
(1) the division of a city by legislative regulation into districts and the prescription and 
application in each district of regulations having to do with structural and architectural 
designs of buildings and of regulations prescribing use to which buildings within designated 
districts may be put Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381, 384 (1925) 
(p.995). 
(2) The essence of zoning in a city is territorial division according to the character of the lands 
and structures and their peculiar suitability for particular uses, among other considerations, 
and uniformity of use within the division. Per Collins v. Board of Adjustment, 3 N.J. 200,205-
06, 69 A.2d 708, 710 (1949) (Polsky 1975: p.995, italics authors’). 
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A third example was offered by Cappel (1991): 
Zoning is the most pervasive and familiar form of local government control over land use. In 
a zoned legal regime, land is divided into geographical districts or zones pursuant to local 
ordinance; municipal regulations then specify the types of land use permitted within each 
zone.  Zoning ordinances typically regulate matters such as maximum building mass and 
height, location of a building on its site, maximum density of residential construction, and 
whether land can be used for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes (Cappel 1991: 
p.617, italics authors’). 
Some examples offered by planning and public bodies, in 
chronological order, are the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority 
(1982); Jones (1990); Macintosh, Phillips, and Clough (2002); Stark 
County (2005); Hall County Board of Commissioners (2009); and the 
Planning Institute of Australia (2014), formerly the Royal Australian 
Planning Institute. 
The Australian Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority defined 
a zone clearly in terms of an area and its uses.  The word “delineation” 
was not used, but implied. 
Q17: What is a “Zone”?  A Zone is a named area of reef, sea floor, air space and water within 
which certain activities, uses and access are regulated (Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
Authority 1982: p.7, italics authors’). 
The specification of areas and specific regulations are elements of a 
definition by another maritime study: 
Zoning is a form of land use control that has long had application in the field of town planning, 
where it has served traditionally to regulate certain activities, essentially construction and 
other works within a specific area (de Klemm and Shine 1993).  Zoning is usually achieved by 
means of a plan drawn up for an entire administrative unit of territory, usually a municipality.  
Per de Klemm, C. and C. Shine, 1993.  Biological Diversity Conservation and the Law.  IUCN, 
Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, U.K 292p.) (Macintosh, Phillips, and Clough 2002: p.19, 
italics authors’). 
An American Planning Association publication by Jones described 
zoning: 
In most cities of any size, each and every parcel of land has been designated by the local 
government with a certain zoning category, which identified what uses are permitted (and, 
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in effect, what uses are not permitted) on that piece of land (Jones 1990: p.50, italics 
authors’). 
A parcel of land is land demarcated. 
The Hall County Board’s definition spelled out the concept of mapping 
and the separation of uses. 
Zoning is the practice of specifying different uses for land based on zones, which are mapped 
out separating one set of land uses from another.  The rules for the zones are placed on the 
property by the County Commissioners.  They may include a wide range of regulations that 
detail the allowable uses for the property, commercial versus residential use, access, building 
height, hours of operation, lot coverage, materials for construction or buffers against 
adjacent uses and many other conditions that deal with the type of uses and buildings that 
people want or expect to see being built next door to them (Hall County Board of 
Commissioners 2009: p.1, italics authors’). 
Likewise, the “Stark County Rezoning Application Directions, A Zoning 
- Update, 2005” gave a definition that included mapping and land use 
designation: 
Zoning is a system of land use regulation that controls the physical development of land.  It 
is a legal mechanism by which local government is able to regulate an owner’s right to use 
privately owned land for the sake of protecting the public health, safety, and/or general 
welfare.  Land is mapped into different zones with the primary purpose of promoting 
compatible land uses and to separate incompatible uses (Stark County 2005, italics authors’). 
The current official definition of zoning on the website of the Planning 
Institute of Australia contains elements of partitioning land into 
smaller areas and the land uses prescribed for these areas. 
Each Council area is divided into a number of smaller areas in the Development Plan, which 
are called “zones”.  Zones are used as a way of grouping areas with similar characteristics 
such as land use together and setting outcomes for the area through policy.  Zones are 
typically based on land uses such as residential, industrial and commercial.  The policy that is 
included within each zone in the Development Plan then reinforces the type of zone.  The 
way zones differentiate from one another includes defining the types of uses that are not 
envisaged or encouraged in the area, e.g. in a residential zone housing will be encouraged 
but industrial developments will not and vice versa (Planning Institute of Australia 2014, 
italics authors’). 
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Some definitions of zoning adopted in academic studies that fall 
within the second type of definition include those by Wheeler, 
Fittipaldi, Forrest, and Marlatt (1988); Stoddard (1987); Ko (2009); 
and Micelli and Faggiani (2001). 
The definition of zoning by Wheeler, Fittipaldi, Forrest, and Marlatt 
(1988) is typical of the second type of definition: 
Zoning: First, what is "zoning"?  In the most basic terms, zoning is the separation of land uses 
into categories of similar uses and the regulation of those uses within each category.  In the 
United States, local government zoning ordinances are based on the state enabling 
legislation which authorizes those governments to zone.  Almost without exception, those 
state enabling acts are based on the 1926 (rev. ed.) Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA).  
As its authors stated, that act was intended to: "lessen congestion in the streets; to secure 
safety from fire, panic, and other dangers; to promote health and general welfare; to provide 
adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration 
of population..."  The fundamental premise of zoning is that uses which are incompatible with 
each other, for whatever reason, should be separated to avoid damages to each use from 
that incompatibility.  The best example of conventional zoning is an official zoning map which 
covers the entire…Page 9 (Wheeler, Fittipaldi, Forrest, and Marlatt 1988: p.1988, italics 
authors’). 
Relying on Ervin et al. (1977), Ko’s (2009) definition was also a form 
of the Abercrombie expression: partition of land into areas and 
specification of uses/activities: 
Zoning is a universal form of development control.  It may be defined as the practice of 
dividing a land area into districts within which only specified activities may take place (Ervin 
et. al. 1977).  Zoning may also be considered as the main legal instrument for the control and 
ordering of the production and of the appropriation of the built environment (Luciana Corrêa 
do Lago 2006) (Ko 2009: p.6, italics authors’). 
The same is true of Micelli and Faggiani’s (2001) definition, which, like 
that of Wheeler, Fittipaldi, Forrest, and Marlatt (1988); Lai (1999); and 
Stark County (2005) mentioned above, also specified the 
internalization of externalities as an intention: 
The planning technique of the zoning can be defined as a device for regulating land use within 
a spatial area and it represents a tool through which a community can deal with the 
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externalities raised by the physical and spatial interaction typical of the city or region 
contexts (Micelli and Faggiani 2001: p.3, italics authors’). 
Foy’s (2012) definition is a recent example of this type.  
Abercrombie’s concept of dedication was expressed as designation. 
Zoning is the method by which governments designate which uses can be permitted in a 
given area… (Foy 2012: p.30). 
The work of Stoddard, inspired by Wickersham (1981), is an 
example of the third type of question, focusing on the categorization 
of uses into classes or groups: 
Zoning…group different land uses into a few broad categories…per Wickersham (1981) 
(Stoddard 1987: p.17, italics authors’). 
Wills’ (1980) earlier and useful textbook on the economics of planning 
mentioned in passing the nature of zoning in terms of its purposes: 
…to eliminate those external diseconomies that the construction of ‘undesirable’ property 
features may impose upon other properties in any given zoning district.  Zoning seeks to 
minimise total external effects by separating land uses (Wills 1980: p.80, italics authors’). 
Alexander’s (1992) definition in his process approach to planning 
pinpoints the functional separation and restriction of uses in urban 
areas: 
Zoning, that is the regulation of urban development by separating and restricting urban areas 
by function, spread from New York throughout the land (Alexander 1992: p.29, italics 
authors’). 
Although separation and restriction in the description may involve 
lines marking limits, the delineation of boundaries is not explicit. 
Stoddard’s, Wills’ and Alexander’s definitions can be a first or second 
type of question that pinpoints the concept and practice of grouping 
several land uses into an element of zoning. 
Lessons learnt 
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At least three important lessons can be learned or inferred from the 
survey of mainstream planning literature above. 
(a) Boundary delineation as the essence of zoning 
First, the most important feature of zoning should be boundary 
delineation. The purposes, characteristics, and consequences of 
zoning may differ from place to place, change from time to time, and 
vary due to different institutional arrangements.  The variations are 
in a logical sense accidental.  However in a modern context, without 
a clearly defined boundary no zone is tenable, as that is definitional, 
if not ontological. 
Inspired by Lafferty and Frech III’s (1978) idea that “the entire 
town is a zone” and drawing attention to the neglect of the spatial 
dimension in research on property rights at the time, Lai (1994, 1997: 
p.234) advanced the argument that boundary delineation is an 
essential element of zoning at various levels from the political-
economy level of state border demarcation down to district level 
matters like town planning and traffic management.  Although zoning 
can be done without much planning, spatial planning – good or bad, 
private or public, deliberate or incidental – cannot be done without 
zoning. 
Therefore, all planning jurisdictions are, in fact, zoned, although 
officially, they may be called “non-zones”.  This is the true meaning of 
Punter’s (1999) careful description of the absence of zoning in 
America: 
There are as many local government units which do not administer zoning at all as to 
emphasize the absence of controls over much of the country… (Punter 1999, p.5). 
Unlike its American counterpart, which has a finer differentiation of 
zones within a local planning area and, hence, is known to be a zoning 
regime, the British system is one of zoning by local government, which 
 Progress in Planning 
42 
 
treats the entire local government area as one zone in which all 
redevelopments and changes in use other than exempted categories 
need prior permission.   
 Colonial Hong Kong imitated this British approach and 
introduced the concept of “Development Permission Areas,” within 
which all new developments and changes in use need approval by the 
Town Planning Board (TPB).  Houston, represented in the title of 
Siegan’s (1970) seminal paper as a “non-zoning” city, was, in fact, not 
entirely free from government zoning.  The state of Texas generated 
land parcels demarcated by roads and controlled its subdivisions and 
road developments. (Recall the question in Part 2 in relation for 
provision of railways and public roads. Public roads are typical zones 
used by the modern state the bounds of which (i.e. the verges) 
demarcate urban and suburban private property boundaries.)  What 
was absent was merely a government plan that was expressly called 
a zoning plan.  Houston, as explained below with reference to 
authorities in law, was a case of “private zoning,” though Cappel 
(1991) called it “pre-zoning” in the same way he described New Haven. 
(b) Two assumptions: zoning as a state planning method and zoning 
as imposed unilaterally by the state 
Secondly, apart from the important point that zoning necessarily 
involves spatial demarcation or delineation, the works reviewed 
above generally have two presumptions that are theoretically worth 
reconsideration. 
The first presumption is that zoning, as boundary delineation, 
must be a government or public thing.  The second is that the state 
can only zone by edict.  The first presumption can be rebutted by 
examples of private zoning and other forms of zoning by contract. All 
these examples are well-researched demonstrations of the 
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usefulness of mutual consent to development using common law 
devices without any imposed zoning legislation. 
While no private plan is completely free from state input, as 
argued above, private zoning on a scale and quality as good as, if not 
superior to, state zoning does exist.  Development control by 
restrictive covenants in Houston is a case in point.  Houston’s system 
can be more precisely described as a form of private zoning by 
agreement within a broad land system zoned by state roads.  Both 
state and private zoning were involved, although the former was 
infrastructural rather than regulatory.   
Another good example of private zoning in the absence of state 
planning legislation is the creation of leasehold estates out of 
freehold estates.  Some basic private planning in terms of defining the 
areas, road access, land use, and building codes is often involved.  A 
good reference is the work of George (2000) on Liverpool Park Estates 
in Britain.  Today, private zoning in the presence of planning 
legislation continues with large sites under private ownership.  The 
layouts of these sites, typically designed by developers and approved 
under the state planning system, usually designate different areas for 
different uses or activities. 
Private zoning can also happen in the absence of planning 
legislation, but only with government approval on a consensual basis.  
In a nutshell, zoning need not always be brought about by legislation 
or the unilateral dictate of the state and indeed, on our earlier 
argument in part 1, may even be a natural feature of pre-state 
communities.  The case of “non-zoning” in Houston, where control of 
development was by way of restrictive covenants, was truly one of 
“private zoning,” which is a term of art in legal research.  This can be 
found in the title of such works as those by Lundberg (1973), and 
Shepard (2011) and was cited in the texts of Urban (1973); Ross, Smith, 
and Pritt (1996); and Stringham, Miller, and Clark (2010), among many 
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others.  The persuasive Gordon and Richardson (2001) and the much 
cited Deng (2003) adopted the term in their planning studies. 
The expression, “private zoning,” to the best of the authors’ 
knowledge, was first used in the 1958 issue of Wisconsin Law Review 
to describe the case of Milwaukee by Beuscher (1958) as a preface for 
the subject matters of two excellent articles by Consigny and Zile 
(1958) and Zile (1959).  The last two works explained how restrictive 
covenants controlled land use in Milwaukee before state zoning 
legislation came along.  Although “both articles should be of interest 
to lawyers, land planners, land economists, students of urban 
problems, land developers and just plain home purchasers” (Beuscher 
1958: p.611), the case of Houston from Siegan’s (1970) point of view 
was far better known.   
Urban (1973) wrongly claimed that “Houston is the only area 
that has anything like ‘private zoning.’” (1973, Fn4, p.1656).  Two 
important findings of Urban’s legal treatise were that the common 
law courts in the U.S.: (a) regarded restrictive covenants as a means 
of “private zoning” and (b) imposed rules for zoning laws to nullify 
those covenants that violated public planning law principles.  Cappel 
(1991) described private zoning in New Haven to be one of “pre-
zoning”.  This was probably due to the fact that neither Consigny and 
Zile (1958) nor Zile (1959), not to mention Milwaukee, were 
mentioned in Siegan’s (1970) work or in the aforementioned works 
on private zoning.  To be fair, Siegan’s (1970) work inspired a host of 
well-documented case studies on “private zoning” by means of 
restrictive covenants, notably in New Haven by Cappel (1991) and 
Celebration, Florida by Stringham, Miller, and Clark (2010). 
Note that the private zoning cases of Milwaukee (Consigny and 
Zile 1958; Zile 1959), Houston (Siegan 1970), New Haven (Cappel 1991) 
and Celebration (Stringham, Miller, and Clark 2010) did not involve 
the state playing an active planning role by means of legislation.  This 
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did not mean that private zoning cannot involve the state to deal with 
private parties on commercial principles without resorting to its 
legislative faculty.  In a leasehold land system, the relationship 
between the state and the developer can be contractual and on equal 
footing.  A good example is the development of Discovery Bay on 
Lantau Island, Hong Kong. (Lai, Davies and Lorne 2015)  
During the late 1970s, the developer, Hong Kong Resort Co. Ltd., 
bought land under agricultural leases and obtained government 
consent to open up the land for residential, commercial, and golf 
course development.  The property was cut off from the rest of Hong 
Kong in terms of road transport and the only access to the land until 
1997 was by sea.  The government provided no infrastructural 
support and the developer had to form sites and build a large 
reservoir, piers, seawalls, etc.  All development had to be in 
accordance with a master layout plan agreed to by the land authority, 
the District Office (later District Lands Office), the decisions of which, 
unlike with the Town Planning Board (TPB), could not be subject to 
judicial review.  The result has been a clear commercial and planning 
success. A private and well-planned community with a large 
expatriate population has grown up on Lantau in phases.  In 2000, the 
TPB imposed the first statutory town plan on the whole settlement.  
This is an example of what Lai (1996, 1998) described as “zoning by 
contract” or “zoning by consent”. 
Another more interesting example of private zoning under 
common law, which dated back to 1921, can be found in Colonial 
Hong Kong.  It was significant because the mechanism was not one by 
restrictive covenant or lease term, so it was different in terms of 
institutional arrangements from “pre-zoning” in Cappel’s (1991) 
sense, “non-zoning” in Siegan’s (1970, 1994) sense, or “private zoning” 
in the sense of Gordon and Richardson (2001).   
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The example in question is one in which a private board of 
directors that governs shareholders as owners of houses in a private 
company achieves zoning via their decisions.  As reported by Lai and 
Kwong (2012), the Shek O Development Company Limited (SODCL), a 
private limited company formed in 1921, bought a piece of leasehold 
land from the Colonial Hong Kong Government for the express 
purpose of promoting the sport of golf.  Shareholders were entitled 
to build a house subject to the board’s approval, while altering and 
alienating the property required the prior permission of the same 
board, which operated like a private government.  The fundamental 
difference between a state price control and planning or building 
board and this SODCL board of directors was that submission to the 
latter was voluntary since it was the result of individual decisions to 
buy (or, more properly speaking, being allowed to buy) shares in 
SODCL.  The property values of the SODCL houses, saved from the 
usual tendency to increase the density of land use by transforming 
properties into apartment blocks, far exceeded any house elsewhere 
in Hong Kong. 
(c) Zone boundaries are treated as decision variables but lot 
boundaries as non-existing 
 
All works examined deem zone boundaries as policy variables subject 
to modifications. That is true by definition, However, other than those 
of Lai (1994, 1996, 1997, 1998), none the works examined above 
mention private property boundaries in relation to the government 
zoning boundaries, nor any issues pertaining to the delineation of the 
latter regarding say exactitude or scale. It would seem as if the 
question for each government planned zone is designed for one single 
owner or unit of land use within exactly the confines of that zone.        
 
Part 5:  Scenarios of zoning  
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The literature review affirms that modern zoning involves boundary 
delineation, though the relationship between the boundaries of 
planned zones and private lots is under-researched. Equally, although 
most scholars see zoning only as a government activity, Part 3 shows 
that zoning, and the attendant boundaries, is also an outcome of 
other, non-government arrangements. In all cases the state plays an 
important part, via zoning of one sort or another, in defining and 
redefining property boundaries.  The following discussion of scenarios 
of zoning is Coasian in the sense that these boundary issues are not 
trivial in theory or practice and have significant transaction cost 
implications.   It is also Hayekian in the sense that the role of 
information discovery is involved.  The state is visibly involved, as the 
delineation of boundaries has at least traditionally had a military or at 
least state provided security connection.19   
 
 Private property involves exclusivity and, hence, state protection 
against incursions, implicit or actual, via the state’s monopoly of 
“organized violence”.  In fact, in many instances throughout history, 
although possibly as a by-product of its more specifically military 
concerns, the military was often the best equipped for and involved 
in the demarcation of initial private property boundaries and the 
establishment of a geodetically integrated land system20.  But this 
political economic interpretation of zoning, as backed by the might of 
the state, is less significant than its role in subsequently attenuating, 
assigning/reassigning, conferring, expropriating and returning private 
property rights, their efficiency in terms of transaction costs and more 
particularly in their informational implications for transaction costs.  
                                                          
19 It is worth noting how late in human history the distinction between the military and the police 
functions of the state’s monopoly of organized violence manifested itself in organizational terms. 
Indeed in many states the distinction is still blurred, as in France, for example, where one part of 
the ‘police’ force, the Gendarmerie, remains part of the Ministry of Defence. In colonies like Hong 
Kong the distinction was never fully institutionalized, colonial police forces being manifestly para-
military in appearance, organization and relationship to the civilian population.  
20 For Britain, see Hewitt (2010).   
 Progress in Planning 
48 
 
These factors are summarized in the scenarios with their implications 
for the market in Table 1.  The focus here is on zone boundaries, 
which hitherto have received far less attention than other planning 
concerns considered as substantial. 
 
Table 1: Zoning Scenarios and Their Transaction costs and 
Informational Dimensions 
About here 
Caption for Table 1: Zoning Scenarios and Their Transaction Cost, Informational & Innovative 
Dimensions 
 
Scenario 1: Conflict of zoning  
 
When the state planner imposes a new zone on existing private 
properties, the conventional neo-institutional economic analysis 
would   focus on the attenuation, if not nullification, of the freedom 
of the land owner, in terms of her/his exclusive rights in using, 
deriving income from or alienating the land (Lai 1997; Webster and 
Lai 2003).  Such attenuation is either addressed in terms of freedom 
of property; evaluated as an empirical question as to whether or not 
and to what extent the zoning actually enhances or reduces property 
values (Lai 1994); or it is interpreted as a rent-seeking or rationing 
mechanism with social/class segregation intent and implications 
(Perin 1975).  In either case, the issue of compensation for regulatory 
takings, down zoning (or “regulatory zoning”) (Fischel 1995; Alterman 
2010) and betterment is frequently a political bone of contention.   
 
 It is not the purpose of this monograph to be involved in these 
econo-political or socio-economic debates. Rather it draws attention 
to the phenomenon that the boundaries of the former – a state 
imposed zone - may not and often do not correspond neatly to those 
of the latter – private lots. Nonetheless prescriptions for the land the 
former happen to enclose prevail over any property rights of the 
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latter if they are in conflict.  A good example of this would be where 
an existing private lot is partitioned by new zone boundaries. The 
property is thereby separated by the two zoned uses imposed on it, 
necessarily forcing a fragmentation of use for the private site. This 
was exactly the factual background of Euclid v. Ambler Realty where 
a private lot was traversed by a line drawn by the government planner 
which divided the site into an industrial and residential area with the 
outcome that the property owner was disallowed using any land on 
the site for housing for fear of industrial pollution.  If such a mismatch 
is unintentional (i.e. not for a specific and necessary planning 
purpose), then it would be a source of extra transaction costs, and 
hence inefficiency for any private property development.  Such an 
unintended mismatch, in which the state planner creates information 
confusion for property owners, is due mainly to the planning 
processes lack of understanding about or care for pre-existing 
property rights.  This is a typical knowledge problem confronting the 
state stressed by Hayek (1944, 1960) and compounded by the 
practice tradition of the modern government planner to plan on small 
scale maps ignoring lot boundaries.  In Coasian terms, transaction 
costs of information are far from zero. Theoretically, the state planner 
can avoid or rectify this, but the trouble is that s/he has no incentive 
to do so and the speed of rezoning is faster than any rectification 
attempt. Figure 5A shows an example of conflict of zoning in which a 
planned zone imposed on private lots divides a lot into two parts. 
 
Figures 5A and 5B about here 
 
Caption for Figure 5A: Conflict of Zoning (Forced Division) 
 
Caption for Figure 5B: Conflict of Zoning (Forced Combination) 
 Another example of conflict of zones due to boundary 
problems is the reverse of subdivision and is intentional. A much 
bigger zone is imposed to neatly envelope several target private 
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properties and a development control requirement is imposed. 
Expresssly to avoid piecemeal outcomes, redevelopment of the zoned 
area is thus only possible when it is done en bloc.  This situation is 
shown in Figure 5B. This type of zoning is often a prelude to takings 
when the purpose is urban renewal, as transaction costs of 
cooperation of all owners to produce a joint redevelopment scheme 
are often prohibitively high and the state has an excuse to use its 
prerogative to confiscate private property.   To an owner who indeed 
wants to redevelop, his/her decision would be contingent on the 
consent and cooperation of all neighbours whose land parcels are 
unilaterally bundled by the state.  The uncooperative owners are 
often accused of “holding out” when in fact the state is creating the 
problem by imposing a new constraint on the exclusive freedom of 
use of one’s land. The situation in terms of property values is worse 
than zoning all properties to preserve them as built heritage, and 
certainly different from the scenario in which landowners voluntarily 
enter into a treaty with adjoining property owners to subject 
individual use, income and alienation rights to collective decisions as 
in the case of SODCL seeking to enhance collective property value by 
maintaining a holistic architectural and life style.  As in the previous 
case, “Changing zoning is a difficult, alienating, time-consuming and 
expensive process” (Mundy and Lane 2011: p. 567) in terms of 
transaction costs. 
 
The mechanism “transfer of development rights” (TDR) is in this 
context pertinent to a discussion of conflict of zoning.  In the property 
rights and planning literature, TDR has been discussed and applied 
with a view to untie the value of a property from its original boundary 
confines, thus achieving savings in various kinds of transaction costs 
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such as those for compensation calibration, political articulation and 
violence. In practice, it can mean: 
(a) a property owner may transfer land coverage, (residential) 
development rights, and (residential) allocations from one part of 
a site he owns to another part of the same site (Maraist 1995) or 
to another site;    
(b) on elaboration, a predetermined maximum level of development 
within a specified region is distributed as “development rights” 
landowners within the region such that landowners who keep 
their development levels below their allotted development rights 
level can sell their surplus development rights to other 
landowners, or they can use them to offset development on other 
properties (Shogren et al 2003);  
(c) a way used by the state to compensate a land owner deprived of 
his property by exchanging with him another piece of government 
land of comparable economic value by mutual agreement; or    
(d)   a tradable and redeemable land certificate which can be used to 
obtain a certain ratio of new sites planned and serviced by the 
state. 
Methods (a) and (b) simply make an un-exploited development 
potential under a state cap transferrable and hence more efficient 
than a situation where such transfer is not allowed. In the words of 
John Costonis the pioneer in this concept, “Development rights 
transfer breaks the linkage between particular land and its 
development potential by permitting the transfer of that potential, or 
"development rights," to land where greater density will not be 
objectionable .” (Costonis 1975: p.85-86. Italics authors).  Though 
economists agree that this is “efficient” (Innes 1997), private property 
rights are attenuated without due compensation. Renard (2007) 
questioned the concept of TDR as it rests on the contentious 
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assumption that a private property owner has “a right to capital gain 
even if this gain is the result of the general evolution of urban growth, 
including the construction of infrastructure by public authorities, 
without any activity of the landowner.”  This view is in the vein of 
Henry George and certainly does NOT apply to jurisdictions where 
there are fiscal betterment levies or “lease modification premia”. In 
any event both (a) and (b) met with limited success in the US (String 
et al 1996). Method (c) is the real TDR that satisfies the compensation 
principle. This mechanism is fair and is justifiable especially where the 
land surrendered is to be conserved for its heritage or scientific 
interest.   
 
One application of Principle (c) of TDR is for what planners call 
“land adjustment” (Liebmann 2000, Xu et al. 2015), which seeks to 
regularize private land parcels of irregular shape into rectilinear-
shaped units for a modern layout.  Conceptually a modern application 
of the surrender and re-grant concept, land adjustment reduces the 
transaction costs of the use and commodification of land, while 
conforming land boundaries to modern transport routes and 
development designs.  
 
An actual successful case of TDR by way of method (d) was the 
issue by colonial Hong Kong of a transferrable “Letter A” (“Letter B”) 
for voluntary surrender (forced resumption) of agricultural land. This 
can be used to either (a) purchase a certain amount of urban land in 
any future government land sale by auction or tender; (b) obtain an 
annual payment according to a schedule; (c) surrender the land to the 
state for a redemption sum.  These Letters A/B were used to 
efficiently collect farmland for new town development, predicated on 
modern zoning plans, in which such letters were used by developers 
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to participate in private development.   They lowered the transaction 
costs of peacefully freeing land locked up in a mosaic of irregular 
shaped lots owned by villagers who could no longer rely on cultivation 
to make a living.    
 
Scenario 2: Borderline non-zoning 
 
Zone and property boundaries are lines.  Conceptually, as we have 
noted, lines have no thickness.  But unless such lines are entirely and 
closely based on property boundaries as shown on the largest scale 
topographic survey maps, when they are plotted on a small scale 
cadastral or zoning map, some small properties that look big enough 
to accommodate a house or supermarket can actually encroach on 
these lines.  Any such encroachment, whether small or large, may 
leave it uncertain as to which zone affected properties belong in.   
 
 This is what often happens to land in rural areas, where small 
properties tend to be located.  In Hong Kong, the zoning map of an 
Outline Zoning Plan for the urban area is typically drawn to a scale of 
1:5,000 but a Rural Outline Zoning Plan for the suburban and rural 
area is to a smaller scale of 1:7,500 to 10,000.  A “small house” 
exempted from the Buildings Ordinance, measuring 20 feet times 35 
feet, can stand partly along a zoning line on such a map. If we assume 
a mean of 1:8,000 for the purpose of a calculation, on a plan to that 
scale 20 feet is represented by a line 3/100ths of an inch long and 35 
feet by one 21/400ths, a dot on the map exactly .0825 sq.in. Even on 
the 1:5,000 plans, the ‘dot’ is just 0.132 sq.in. So confusion is not 
unknown.21 Figure 6 shows an example of this scenario. 
                                                          
21  See Metro Planning Committee Paper No. A/H14/55 on 28 Barker Road, the Peak. Town 
Planning Board, Minutes of 370th Meeting of the Metro Planning Committee held at 9:00 a.m. 
on 28.3.2008. 
 




Figure 6 about here 
 
Caption for Figure 6: Border Line Zoning 
 
 The origin of this phenomenon, as explained in Part 2, is the use by 
government planners of small scale maps in planning. Again, the state 
planner can overcome this information confusion problem by 
providing a large scale representation of these boundary lines and a 
boundary commission to resolve disputes.  Due to the great 
advancement in digital technology, such an approach would no longer 
incur extra, prohibitively high transaction costs. The question is 
whether the government planner is willing so to act given established 
practices and, to the government planner, the perceived transaction 
costs for the planning system of instituting new practices.  
 
 Taking up on the earlier point about the penumbrality of zoning, in 
a sense borderline non-zoning is an inevitable planning hazard 
because the mental approach of a ‘zoner’ is by definition indifferent 
to any fractal irregularity of both the land and land-occupancy. To use 
a common nautical phrase, small properties near zone boundaries 
cannot but be at risk of “falling through the gaps in the planking”. The 
metaphor makes the point that on a planked deck, or floor, a seamless 
joint may be an ideal, but even were the time that must necessarily 
be spent in better fairing plank edges to be economically feasible, a 
perfect fit is not possible. Caulking is thus a given. Zones, in that sense, 
‘plank’ the ‘deck’ of the ship of state and it is no business of those 
who lay the deck – the planners – to worry unduly about gaps and 
irregularities in the seams that may cause leaks that vex the hugger-
mugger of bunk spaces in the steerage accommodation below. Where 
the planks prove to leak, causing inconvenience and damage to the 
property of those below, that is the job of the caulker to fix, or, to 
escape the metaphor, the job of lawyers, appeal board panelists and 
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judges. The analysis points to the need to enrich transaction cost 
vocabulary by calling these “boundary costs”. 
 
Scenario 3: Incomplete zoning  
 
A boundary is a technically closed loop.  In any case where a private 
property boundary does not form an unambiguous loop, the property 
is incompletely designated. This could happen, given the simple 
Coasian reason for this is that the state does not have perfect 
information, when one side of the property is legally contested or 
uncertain, as in the case of any maritime or riparian border of a site.  
A situation of commons arises in the space along the waterfront if, as 
is sometimes the case, there is a lack of boundary precision. Such lack 
of precision can result from seashore related boundaries resting on 
potentially uncertain metrics. Typical of these would be the once 
decidedly ill-fixed “Sea at High Water Mark”. 22  Perhaps most 
vexatious would be cases where the exact azimuth of the sea shore at 
the point where the line of division between one marine lot and the 
next reached the sea could not be exactly determined because of the 
uncertainties noted. For without an exact azimuth of the line of the 
shore boundary at the boundary between properties, the ‘correct’ 
azimuth, at right angles to the shoreline, of any extension seawards 
of the lot dividing line would be uncertain, and hence the allocation 
of riparian rights of any kind, would not have been exactly determined.   
 
 In the first case we can generalize by noting that where the shore 
boundary is uncertain, landowners will tend as a result to consider the 
real border of a lot as lying as far out into the water as practically 
possible. They will accordingly carry out land reclamation as a rent-
seeking response.  This creates transaction costs as a result of 
                                                          
22 The full theorization of tides was not achieved until Doodson’s (1921) work. See Chapter 11 in 
Cartwright and Melchior (2001) and in Hong Kong, a final settlement of the High Water Mark had 
to wait until a full, 19 year run of observations was completed in 1989. 
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disputes with adjoining owners and/or between the state and 
individual owners. Legislative intervention is required to complete the 
loops.   
 
 This was a particular problem in early colonial Hong Kong where 
the first 50 Marine Lots, sold by auction on 14 June 1841, were tightly 
defined only on their landward bounds by a road, each with 100 feet 
frontage on the sea and 100 feet on the road (Sayer 1980). The result 
was an extension of the lots to seaward at the least cost to lot owners, 
who significantly expanded their lots where the foreshore bound was 
only loosely defined. The government’s object, once these problems 
arose, was to replace the shifting, privately controlled foreshore by a 
publicly owned road fronted by a seawall between Marine Lots and 
the sea, thereby ‘closing’ the previously loosely demarcated private 
property loop by a clear bound between public and private property. 
At the same time, by creating a definitive sea-edge boundary, 
government could accord marine lot leaseholders’ rights at that 
boundary, such as rights to land goods and passengers, to construct 
approved landing piers, etc. Figure 7 illustrates this form of 
incomplete zoning.  The government solution to run a road along a 
reclamation to delimit the seaward frontage of the lots. 
 
Figure 7 about here 
 
Caption for Figure 7: Officially Forgotten Zone 
 
 The Foreshore and Sea Bed Ordinance of 1901 was introduced not 
only to stop marine lot owners from privately creating new property 
through reclamation, but also to secure the quality and durability of 
the sea wall defences, affirm the public right of access to the 
foreshore, create the conditions for precise foreshore lot delineation 
and, therefore, definitive loop closure for waterfront properties. The 
effect of the Ordinance was to differentiate Marine Lots into “Class A” 
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and “Class B” Lots, but in so doing strictly to define their seaward 
boundaries and the rights with respect to the foreshore each type had.  
 
 “Class B” Marine Lots merely had their frontage on a public road 
that ran along the sea shore. Other than in name they did not differ 
from any ordinary Inland Lot. No rights obtained to such a leaseholder 
to access to the seashore different to the rights of all other members 
of the public.  
 
 There remained “Class A” Marine Lots, which had a public road 
between them and the sea. These were largely an historical hangover 
from Hong Kong’s early days, but because they did once have a sea 
frontage abutting the sea, such lots were accepted to have additional 
rights. These were summarized as,23 
 
“subject to the public right of navigation of the sea and harbour, and fishing 
therein, a private right of access to the sea or harbour, and a right to bring 
vessels alongside their Lots or portions of Lots, and to discharge and load cargo 
there, and to embark and disembark there. In the exercise of this right there 
must be no unnecessary or unreasonable interference with the public right.”  
 
 Lastly came such Marine Lot holders as operated shipyards, docks 
and slipways. These are and remain a special case and, for the 
purposes of clarity of boundaries, have their terrestrial properties 
extended to include a delineated area of seabed, thereby negating 
any uncertainty of boundary location occasioned by changing tidal 
data or changing global sea levels – the latter today a matter of 
significant concern given the expectations of the consequences of 
global warming. 
 
Scenario 4: Officially forgotten zones  
 
                                                          
23 Government of Hong Kong (1931: para 32). 
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 When de facto zones that exist in the memories of a social or ethnic 
group are denied by another group that holds power, the question of 
officially forgotten zones emerges.  Relevant information on these 
places is disregarded by the state.  Naturally, a conflict of zones, which 
may well frustrate or raise the transaction costs of private 
development, according to the official zone boundaries, emerges.  
This is a case of the state misinforming de jure owners.  Typically these 
owners seek the court’s assistance and the court tends to recognize 
only de jure rights, so this does not solve the problem.  Huge political 
transaction costs in bringing about a satisfactory solution, often 
through legislation that compromises the de jure rights assigned by 
the state, may be reached. One can find excellent examples of this 
problem in the indigenous land rights issues in such jurisdictions as 
Canada, the USA, New Zealand and Australia. Figure 8 demonstrates 
a possible officially forgotten zone which contains an official zone.  
How to recognize and treat the tribal shrine beyond a matter of 
“archaeology” or “heritage” in respect of any surviving claimants to 
the forgotten zone, bearing in mind existing de jure property owners 
is a difficult socio-political question.  Reversion of rights is often 
impractical and in any case the property owners, treated as squatters, 
must have some rights to the land they possess.   
 
Figure 8 about here 
 
Caption for Figure 8: Incomplete Zoning 
 
In the New Territories of Hong Kong outside New Kowloon, a major  
forgotten zone exists in the minds of the leaders of so-called 
recognized indigenous villagers who often feel aggrieved by modern 
statutory zoning for Country Park or other basically conservation uses 
as a means to expropriate their original, pre-colonial, land use rights.   
Most of the villagers, under customary Chinese land law, were “land 
skin rights holders” (tenants) leasing land from absentee “land bone 
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rights” holders, who paid the Imperial government a fixed land tax.24 
The British Government ousted the land bone owners and collected 
land taxes directly from the villagers who were mostly land skin rights 
holders, who were granted rights as Crown lessees under Block Crown 
Leases. (Lai et al 2015)   
 
 Adopting the common law stance of the British colonial 
administration, the post-colonial Special Administrative Government 
considers the grievance as a legal nonsense, as the spatial confines of 
their land rights had been exhaustively delimited in the Demarcation 
District Lots Sheets that accompany Block Crown Leases recording 
land uses and buildings as surveyed at the turn of last century.  To 
allow for expansion of the surveyed villages, in the wake of a gigantic 
new town programme which has transformed the New Territories 
into a residential and industrial region, the District Office of the 
colonial government in 1972 defined for each recognized village a 
“village environ” with its perimeter being 300 feet away from 
outmost edge of the outermost lawful village building as found in 
1971.  Occasional grants of Crown Land have been made from time to 
time but the approach has been cautious and small in scale, typically 
to resettle a village affected by public works. The village environ zones 
are restricted government information not disclosed to the public 
though the cores of most of these have been designated Village Type 
Development (V) zones on statutory town plans.   
 
 The mental map of the village leader does not however correspond 
to the zonal boundaries of either the “village environs” or V zones. To 
                                                          
24  No residual land bone rights were allowed to subsist except those on Cheung Chau, for 
unknown policy reasons, which the colonial government recognized as legitimate. The Wong Wai 
Tsak Tong, a body corporate recognized by the colonial administration, was allowed to collect 
rent from all private land on the island of Cheung Chau.  The government passed an ordinance 
Block Crown Lease (Cheung Chau) Ordinance in 1995 to terminate the Block Crown Lease granted 
to the Wong Wai Tsak Tong so as to resolve the disputes between the Wong Wai Tsak Tong and 
the sub-lessees and made compensation. 
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him, always a man by tradition, the real village area appears to stretch 
well beyond the outmost limit of cultivation area, which encircled the 
village environ delineated in 1972. He sees that ‘real’ area as he 
imagines it to have been at the time of the leasing of the New 
Territories from China. It ends, vaguely, where potential expansion 
would be opposed by neighbouring villages. This is so because land 
bone rights holders would not bother or object to expansion of the 
territory of cultivation or any other activities (“doing whatever we 
like”) by land skin rights holders provided the agreed land rent was 
paid. That is, there was no practically entailed contiguity between the 
de jure actual boundaries of the registered land bone rights and those 
de facto of the unregistered land skin rights. If this seems difficult to 
grasp, imagine a closed umbrella where the ‘skin’ (no matter a 
rumpled one) clings tightly to the ‘bone’ of the umbrella shaft. If the 
umbrella is opened – the skin rights holders expand the land under 
cultivation – this has no effect on the area of the bone unless there is 
some sort of official reconciliation of the respective areas: a 
transaction cost the Qing regime’s officialdom was in general 
disinclined to incur.   
 
 There is a need here for some elaboration of the Imperial Chinese 
way of surveying and registering rural land.  The famous Ming Dynasty 
“fish scale atlas” for recording registered land for tax purpose was 
only a topological representation. Land area, the basis of taxation, 
was clearly recorded. However, the transaction costs of monitoring 
illegal unreported expansion of farmland were well known to 
officialdom. In consequence they turned a blind eye to any such 
expansion as rectification would incur the even greater transaction 
costs of enforcement (especially against those with vested interests 
inside a bureaucracy almost identical to the literate gentry class), and, 
possibly, a resultant local uprising. Similarly, the registered land 
owner did not cultivate. He leased his land (registered or otherwise) 
to tenants at a rent which, in the Manchu Qing Dynasty, became 
 Progress in Planning 
61 
 
“fixed forever” as all emperors honoured the promise and will of 
Emperor Hong Hei (Kangxi, 康熙) made in 1713 to never increase tax 
rates. The landlord (i.e., the land bone rights holder) did not bother 
to check whether and how much land the tenant (i.e., the land skin 
rights holder) cultivated and only cared about rent collection. Un-
reporting of land cultivated under this system was massive.   
 
 What evolved was a nominally pro-rata levy based on land area 
under cultivation but a de facto fixed tax paid by the rent-collecting 
land bone rights holder, who played the role of insurance against the 
risk of bad harvests (and hence inability to pay tax) of the land skin 
rights holders.  Though surely individual land skin rights owners knew 
the de facto spatial limit of the land they possessed, they took for 
granted that opening up the wilderness was legitimate “as the 
landlord would not bother.”  This was the state of affairs before the 
commodification of land, when land (its fertility) was an input to 
production rather than an investment good. China’s first modern 
cadastral survey was done 1 year before the downfall of the Manchu 
Empire in 1911, likely with a fiscal revenue intent, and it is a good 
question for the historian as to whether this land auditing exercise 
had to do with the success of the Republican Revolution.   
 
 Although it is not entirely clear what the actual extent of land bone 
rights was (i.e. where the boundaries of a ‘land bone’ lay25), it can be 
presumed to be, as in the case of the village leader’s assumption 
above, at some ill-defined point well-beyond any extant inhabited or 
worked village terrain, where it meets a similar land bone rights claim 
coming the other way. Given that assumption, it followed that at least 
                                                          
25 There appears to be nothing in traditional Chinese land administration that equates to the 
closely surveyed and mapped cadastral system as this had emerged in the western world by the 
time the British annexed Hong Kong. Boundaries were more a matter of customary agreement 
based on long-established practice retained as folk-memory as to what marked the division 
between any one land holding and any other. 
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in theory land skin rights holders (let us say Village A) could extend 
their exploitation of the land around Village A to wherever there were 
no opposing claims by another village. When disputes happened, 
villages resolved them by might, arbitration or treaty.   
 
 In the colonial context therefore, from the land skin villagers’ point 
of view, as long as they continued to pay land tax to the British Crown 
AS IF the Crown were land bone owners to the Manchu Emperor, they 
believed that they should be allowed to enjoy their customary land 
rights to “reclaim land from the wilderness” to some social limit, 
despite these having been long extinguished by the inception of 
common law. Putting that into the language of zoning, we may say 
that Hong Kong’s traditional villagers assume a zone, their village zone, 
within which they may extend cultivation or allocate land for 
residential development, as it suited and today suits them.  
 
 The key point here, extremely difficult to formulate in the modern 
language of cadaster and zone, is that NEITHER bone NOR skin was 
legally defined. Conceptually we have state of affairs ‘A’ at time ‘T’ in 
which the bone rights holder holds the bone rights to the land 
(A)(T)(BRa) on which the land skin rights holder has developed (in 
some sense) housing and fields (A)(T)(SRa). By time ‘T1’ the land skin 
holder, impelled by exigency, demography, curiosity, avidity or 
whatever, has extended the occupied and cultivated area to reach 
state of affairs ‘B’ such that (B)(T1)(SRb)>(A)(T)(SRa) despite there 
being no change at all to the land bone right holder for whom always 
(B)(T1…n)(BRb…n) = (A)(T)(BRa) unless the Imperial authority had 
engaged in an exercise of land holding rectification.  
 
 Obviously for the British Crown, which had created a cadaster by 
exact topographic survey, nothing the villager could do could (or now 
can) conceivably change the nature and extent of the land bone that 
the Crown acquired by treaty and, because of the nature of the 
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western surveying system, had surveyed as in all cases being 
contiguous, one de facto land skin right to the next. Thus with the 
assumption of all land bone rights by the colonial government (except 
those on Cheung Chau under the Wong Wai Tsak Tong), the entire 
basis of traditional land holding was changed in that a traditionally 
passive land bone rights landlord, whose ‘rights’ were in some sense 
independent of villager actions, had been exchanged for an active one 
whose ‘rights’ were clearly laid down on a map. Much more important, 
therefore, the presumed ‘village zone’ within which land skin rights 
could be exercised at the whim of the villagers had disappeared into 
what we might call the ‘total skin/bone’ zone created by the advent 
of the government as holder of all land bone rights. 
 
Scenario 5: Zoning for non-planning: Ghettos and enterprise zones  
 
“Non-zoning”, after the work of Siegan (1970), in the planning 
literature is famous in relation to the mode of planning and 
development in Houston.   Siegan considered the use of restrictive 
covenants in the absence of zoning legislation or zoning schemes 
“non-zoning”, ignoring the original de jure zoning of property 
boundaries, often defined by the public roads that are so primeval in 
private property.     
 
 The non-zoning discussed here is zoning of a place with pre-existing 
properties defined by the state after the event with the intention not 
to interfere with it.  This may happen due to negative reasons, namely 
disputes over jurisdiction; social prejudice and economic 
protectionism in disguise, as in the case of ghettos for the Jews (Clapp 
1986); or a lack of competence, capacity, or confidence of the state in 
handling a unique place for the time being. A case in point in Hong 
Kong was the Kowloon Walled City.  




 This walled city began its life as an Imperial Chinese fort 26 with 
perimeter defensive walls built of granite blocks with privately raised 
funds from Cantonese merchants after the ceding of Hong Kong Island 
in 1842.  When the Kowloon Peninsula was annexed in 1860, the fort 
found itself close to the international land border of the colony of 
Hong Kong denoted by Boundary Street.  In 1898, with the signing of 
the Second Convention of Peking, technically the Convention for the 
Extension of Hong Kong Territory and the leasing of the New 
Territories to the British, the fort became the only piece of land under 
Chinese rule within what was otherwise British sovereign territory.  
The lease treaty expressly provided for a Chinese official presence on 
condition that it did not pose a threat to the security of Hong Kong.  
Within a year of the lease coming into effect, the colonial 
administration found a pretext on which to interpret the Chinese 
officials in the fort as constituting a threat and duly evicted them.27  
 
 With the advent of the new Chinese Republic, from the 1920s till 
1963, save during the Pacific War period, British jurisdiction over the 
city was contested by the Chinese government. Before the War, an 
understanding had been made with China to develop the fort as a 
public park, the colonial government having bought out Chinese 
civilian settlers allowed to stay as Crown lessees for 20 years.  After 
the War, Chinese people from Hong Kong and China moved into the 
city area, now stripped of its walls due to Japanese demolition for 
building materials for expanding the Kai Tak Airport, and built houses.  
They were treated as squatters and they resorted to the Peking 
                                                          
26 Whether the site was related to a Sung Dynasty defence structure for the court when fleeing 
the Mongols awaits further and better research. The discovery of wells in the neighbourhood of 
the city in 2014 by tunneling work for the expanded Mass Transit Rail system lends definite 
support to the presence of Chinese inhabitants in Kowloon dating back to that era. 
27 The claim by the Governor, Sir Henry Blake, was that the Viceroy of Canton was using the 
officials in Kowloon to encourage resistance to British rule as established by the Convention. 
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Chinese government to resist government clearance action.  The 
colonial administration finally acquiesced to the status quo but took 
steps to zone the city area by building new roads along the alignments 
of the demolished northern and eastern walls and to build public 
housing estates to encircle the city according to what was known as 
the “Nunnery Scheme” (Lai 2015, 2016; Lai et al 2015). The 
development or redevelopment of buildings within the encircled area 
was unrestricted by government though vertical reach of any building 
might not affect civil aviation control. Land use was unregulated and 
the government provided only postal and police services.  Laissez faire 
was the order of the city.  Before the handover of Hong Kong to China, 
the city dwellers were compensated and resettled, their buildings 
were demolished and the site was converted, at last, into a public park. 
 
Figure 9 about here 
Caption for Figure 9: Zoning for Non-planning 
 
  Figure 9 shows scenario of a zoned un-planned area.  “Left alone” 
yet encircled by a zone boundary, it is a zone in its own right.  
Normally, provided there is no real Hobbesian anarchy with violence 
within the zone, occupants will form property rights to make living as 
comfortable as possible and investment possible. 
  
 The Kowloon Walled City is arguably the best real world example 
of non-zoning as there was neither state delineation of private land 
parcels nor government intervention by any subdivision, planning or 
building codes as in the case of Houston or Milwaukee. Another way 
of seeing this ‘non-zoning’ is to imagine an entirely zoned territory in 
which one specific area exists defined ONLY by the boundaries of 
zones contiguous to it, which boundaries are however NOT 
boundaries of the excluded area itself.  
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 Three salient points of the actual real estate development and 
transactions inside non-zoned Kowloon Walled City follow. First, pre-
existing building lines were respected in subsequent redevelopment 
as if they were de jure property boundaries, though they were not 
governed by any Crown Lease and could not be registered at the Land 
Registry.  Second, the buying, selling and leasing of housing units was 
not disorderly and no reported violence was involved.  Third, there 
was private supply of water for private use and elevators for 
communal use. This non-zoning of the city, spatially defining in three 
dimensions by the Nunnery Scheme horizontally and Civil Aviation 
Ordinance vertically, in which the state did almost nothing, 
nonetheless lent significant support to government involvement.  
 
 Unlike elsewhere in Hong Kong, the spacing between buildings 
within the city was far narrower because there was no public road 
zones and this affected natural light penetration overall living 
conditions.  Not surprisingly, given also the non-zoning and absence 
of government involvement noted above, sale prices and rentals of 
units inside the city were 30% cheaper than comparable ones outside 
the city. 
  
 The Kowloon Walled City has been depicted in the literature as land 
governed by nobody. Yet, this does not contradict the fact that it was 
not forgotten.  The government consciously did not govern it 
completely precisely because of its uncertain status – we might say its 
azonality or possibly, non-British zonability.  Nonetheless, like every 
piece of land in Hong Kong, it was carefully surveyed and re-surveyed. 
The cadastral records and news reports and the physical form of the 
city within the three-dimensional spatial zones that enclosed it and 
its postal address kept vivid the memory of the boundary of this 
constitutionally disputed piece of territory.  By policy informed by 
Sino-British diplomacy, it was a zone without zoning.     
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 Non-zoning may also be a deliberate and positive way to 
experiment with new ideas under laissez-faire as in the case of 
Houston interpreted as zoned ab initio. Hong Kong after 1997 as a 
“special administrative region” of China under the “one country, two 
systems” policy is expressly to be this kind of experiment.  What 
matters, given the social and political constraints, is that the 
boundaries of the place typically cannot expand or contract.  
Depending on the kind of non-intervention, though the names or 
labels of the zones are unimportant, the delineated areas can become 
notorious ghettos or successful enterprise zones.  Researchers 
generally focus on the passive aspect of the state and treat the issue 
as a static matter.  Few appreciate that given time and a degree of 
peace, stability and no undue interference, informal institutional 
arrangements within these zones will emerge to constrain rent 
dissipation and create new property rights, i.e. Hayekian 
‘spontaneous emergence’ of social arrangements. The Brazilian 
favelas (Neuwirth 2006) are modern cases in point.   
 
Scenario 6: Rights conferring zoning 
 
While the above example of zoning may see new rights created in due 
course, the state often designates certain new zones, in areas without 
any pre-existing rights, as new private and/or public places.  While the 
terms for new property may not be attractive, such zoning does not 
necessarily compromise any pre-existing right.  In the real world, most 
land has some degree of pre-existing rights, entitlements, or 
legitimate expectations and the best examples of rights-conferring 
zones are those re-created in socialist regimes which have adopted 
the market economy and those that allow for reclamation from the 
sea. Two cases in points are the “villages in cities” in China today and 
the inception of the container terminal in Hong Kong. 
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 The “village in city” is an interesting case.  Originating as a rural or 
suburban collectivized place with no de jure private property, it has 
been granted exclusive communal property rights with great 
democratic freedom in “making money”.  As such they are no 
“forgotten zones” or “zones for non-planning” unlike the case of 
Kowloon Walled City.  Their inhabitants are classified as rural 
population and enjoy certain privileges (e.g. greater leniency in state 
imposed birth controls) not available to urban city dwellers but share 
in the financial benefits from any income earned by the village 
collective. The living standards, landscape and governance of these 
villages vary tremendously and generalization is hard. Some have 
taken advantage of their traditional communal buildings as 
architectural and cultural heritage in business and tourism promotion, 
while others have cleared the entire common area for new 
development.   Initially, they were certainly capitalist enterprise zones 
but soon urban city expansion caught up and has spatially engulfed 
them as pockets delineated by formal town plans, which respect the 
irregular boundaries of these collectively owned zones.  Economically 
fully urban, natives of these ‘villages in cities’ are not entitled to the 
social welfare their “urban” neighbours right outside the zones are 
enjoying.  Current planning research focus has been on the 
ghettoizing of these villages due to rural-urban migration (Chen et al 
2013); and on spatial equity and “ghost town” development in some 
of these villages that destroyed any residual arable land for building 
high rise units, which do not sell at all in a falling real estate market.   
What is significant is that the villagers enjoy communal property 
rights conferred on them by the state in relation to the collectives to 
which they belonged. The large number of these villages with great 
variations in environmental and economic performance provide 
researchers ample “urban laboratory” tests on the effects of 
differences in governance, controlling property rights; and/or the 
effects of differences in the degree of exclusive property rights 
controlling governance.  




 The gestation of Hong Kong’s container port as a new form of urban 
place was protracted, a very fiscally conservative government policy 
having decided that any such facility should not be created by way of 
public infrastructure investment.  But once the decision was made, 
private property rights by way of private treaty grant of leasehold 
interests were created for a waterfront land use not known before. 
 
 In the context of the times, containerization was just one of a 
number of unitized cargo carrying solutions in play, and one that was 
not likely to realize a revolution unless four things happened.28 One 
was that the containers in question became standardized so that they 
would fit on any suitably built ship. The second was that other 
transport modes – road and rail – had suitably designed vehicles to 
move the containers to and from ports and the hinterland. And finally 
and most important, that ports and other road and rail infrastructure 
were re-designed and reorganized to accommodate the new form of 
carriage.  
 
 The last was to be a hugely expensive business in four ways, all with 
specific spatial implications for Hong Kong. In terms of urban planning, 
approach roads, container parks and handling systems needed very 
large amounts of flat space, which in Hong Kong was always in short 
supply, especially given rival demands for public housing, roads and 
industry. In terms of port works containerized cargo handling was ill-
suited to existing cargo handling cranes and systems, especially Hong 
                                                          
28 Other contemporary offerings were LASH, Seabee, BACAT, RoRo, LUF and pallet carrier systems 
see I. L. Buxton, R. P. Daggitt, J. King, Cargo Access Equipment for Merchant Ships, London: E & 
F.N. Spon, 1978, Ch.2 and Stephen E. Donlon, Comparative costs of competitive shipping, Theses 
and Major Papers. Paper 67, pp.3-12, Part of the Oceanography and Atmospheric Sciences and 
Meteorology Commons, University of Rhode Island at http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/ma_etds, 
accessed on 21st August 2015.  
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Kong’s main strength, its large harbour with its many buoys and well-
organized mid-stream operations. In terms of naval architecture, 
containers were extremely unsuited to the standard designs of Hong 
Kong’s cargo carrying mainstay, the extant world fleet of break-bulk 
general cargo vessels. And for Hong Kong’s terrestrial infrastructure, 
generations of urban development with a tight grid of narrow streets 
and, more recently, an upwards development of the famous flatted 
factories, combined with the small scale of the vast majority of Hong 
Kong factories meant that the entire distribution system implicit in 
containers needed Hong Kong to undergo a radical spatial overhaul. 
 
 Inevitably the result as far as creating a container port was 
concerned was a gradual process, especially for Hong Kong, which has 
never been a pioneer in anything.  Hong Kong’s business world has 
always modeled itself on the ‘second mouse at the mouse trap’ 
principle, since the first mouse risks a lot and often with fatal results, 
whilst the second mouse usually gets the cheese.  Hong Kong’s 
shipping world was no different. The government worked on a 
parallel public policy principle, which entailed never leading but 
always following and, in general, leaving it to private business to 
invest in infrastructure development that was understood primarily 
to serve private business. The newspaper coverage in Hong Kong 
during the 1960s makes it very clear that the majority of decision 
makers were sat firmly on the fence as far as containerization was 
concerned, portentously claiming, to show simultaneously how 
forward looking and how wise they were, “Yes, but…”29 
                                                          
29 A representative sample of equivocations would be South China Morning Post & Hongkong 
Telegraph, Editorial, 5th May 1966, p.12; a counsel of caution from Hong Kong’s banks, 24th 
September 1966, p. 26; the Director of Marine pointing out both downsides and upsides, 19th 
December 1966, p.6; hesitation over commitment by Hong Kong shipowners, 10th June 1967, 
p.26 and 22nd June 1967, p.12; HMG Forsgate, General Manager of the Wharf Company, on 
problems, 26th October 1967, p.26 – similar doubts continued to be expressed right through until 
beyond 1972, when the container port at Kwai Chung opened, see, for example, 1st March 1972, 




 By the mid-1960s arguments in favour of shifting shipping to 
containers began to appear in the Hong Kong press, though most 
often with respects to ports and shipment patterns elsewhere. 
However, by 1966 the clamour had become loud enough and the 
awareness of the potential of the change that beckoned wide enough 
spread that Government had formed a Container Committee to look 
into the matter and make recommendations. 30 
 
 The Committee was thorough and, for a government committee, 
swift, having been formed in July 1966 and presenting its report to 
the Governor in December. The key recommendation was that work 
should begin by mid-1967 to create a brand new container port in the 
Kwai Chung area – to be reclaimed from the sea as a new zone. 
Government took until October 1968 before it decided it needed to 
revisit the issues, and so commissioned a feasibility study that was 
expected to take eight months to complete. This produced proposals 
in favour of a development for tabling at the Legislative Council in 
August 1969, but only after the lease terms for the new facility were 
made public.31  
 
 Even then government was unsure. Although the preference was 
for a satisfactorily fiscally conservative development path, the initial 
announcement of the tender process allowed two possibilities 
because the process was covered by two separate ordinances each of 
which seemed only to allow one path forward. Under the Public 
                                                          
p.24, where the Norwegian Journal of Commerce and Shipping is quoted as pondering the 
possibility that containerization might prove “a gigantic failure” . 
30 Analysis of South China Morning Post & Hong Kong Telegraph online database at ProQuest 
accessed via University of Hong Kong Libraries, 20th August 2015 shows discussion lifting off in 
1968 and growing rapidly to peak in 1972 thereafter dropping back swiftly to pre-1966 patterns. 
 
31 “Views on Container Terminal Project”, South China Morning Post & the Hongkong Telegraph. 
Oct 10, 1969, p.1 
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Reclamations and Works Ordinance the Government would reclaim 
and form the designated area, and then tenderers would be invited 
for developing the facility. Under the second, the Foreshores and 
Seabed Ordinance, the entire project – reclamation, formation and 
development – would be tendered.32 Finally, in February 1970 the 
government offered seabed leases at Kwai Chung to private sector 
firms or consortia interested in creating the first terminals.33 A project 
of four berths on a total site area of 50.6 hectares was tendered under 
the two possible schemes under the two ordinances. Interestingly, 
the first Outline Zoning Plan that covered the port came into 
existence only well after the private treaty grants were made to the 
operators.34   
 
 The successful tenderers for three of the berths – all exclusively on 
the reclaim, form and develop pattern – were announced on 17th 
August 1970, the fourth tenderer having dropped out.35 The tender 
premium was to be paid in twenty annual instalments.  
 
 In the last quarter of 1970 at the far north-western edges of 
Victoria Harbour, just outside the official harbour limits, the first steps 
were taken to reclaim the massive area of foreshore and seabed.36  
The first berths of the new facility opened on 27th June 1972. Figure 
10 indicates conceptually rights conferment of this kind.  Reclamation 
                                                          
32 “New Stage In Container Terminal Development”, South China Morning Post & the Hongkong 
Telegraph. Feb 14, 1970, p. 20 
33 “Foreshores And Sea Bed Ordinance”, South China Morning Post & the Hongkong Telegraph. 
Feb 14, 1970, p. 11 
34 Plan No. LTW/132 dated 26 November 1971. 
35  “Three firms given berths at new container terminal”, South China Morning Post & the 
Hongkong Telegraph. Aug 18, 1970, p.23 
36 For the letting of the tenders to construct the terminal to Modern Terminals Ltd, Kowloon 
Container Warehouse Co. Ltd., and Sea-Land Orient Ltd., see South China Morning Post & 
Hongkong Telegraph, 18th August 1970, p.23 
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of the sea requires fill materials and these are often extracted in 
places where building platforms can be formed in tandem.  
 
Figure 10 about here 
 
Caption for Figure 10: Rights Conferring Zoning 
 
 By zoning the area of seabed and shoreline in Kwai Chung as 
exclusively for the development of a container port and leasing that 
whole area to a private consortium to develop and then operate the 
facility, the container port zoning conferred rights. In the years since 
then the original four berths and one terminal covering 50.6 hectares 
have increased on a similar development basis through reclamation 
to twenty-four berths providing 6.59 linear kilometres of wharf front 
in nine terminals over an area of 2.17 square kilometres.  In terms of 
TEU throughput, this container port ranked first in the world by 1997 
(Port International 2001). 
  
Scenario 7: Co-development zoning 
 
Also called “joint development zoning”, this is the state zoning a place 
over which jurisdiction is disputed, for competitors or claimants to 
share in its development on an equal basis.  This is likely the starting 
point for a win-win solution if competitors appreciate it as sincere and 
genuine.  As such, the outcome is likely sustainable.   
 
 Antarctica is a good example of co-development for scientific 
research that excludes military and extractive use of the place under 
the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. International law scholar like Terr (1973) 
and Valencia (1986) proposed a joint development zone to overcome 
the disputes over the Spratly Islands. This idea was followed by Mito 
(1997) and Zou (2006).  An attempt to put the idea into practice was 
made by Australia and Indonesia for the Timor Gap (Wilheim 1989).  
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Another case is the joint development zone between Nigeria and Sao 
Tome (Groves 2005). 
 
 The very idea of the need for and probable success of co-
development zoning we would argue to have been implicit in, if 
perhaps not a primary intention of the principles of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III, United 
Nations, 1982). This complex and elegant solution to inevitable 
boundary disputes once technical advances and economic growth 
enhanced the ability of states to project their jurisdictional power 
further out to sea, increased levels of pollution and environmental 
damage, and expanded the possibilities of economic exploitation of 
the sea and the seabed, has known some significant successes where, 
as is not the case in the South China Sea, the various parties have all 
concurred both with the boundaries thereby established and with the 
fundamental approach and spirit of the system UNCLOS III inheres. 
 
 We have mentioned a signal achievement in resolving a potential 
dispute over natural gas resources in the Timor Gap between 
Australia and Timor. This was exactly an application of the UNCLOS III 
rules. A more complex case is that of the North Sea. 
 
 Let us first briefly adumbrate the rules that were intended to be 
applied to decide sea boundaries. The key principles were and are 
simple, albeit resting on the actual historical experience, 
understandings and laws of Western Europe.  
 
 The starting point was a presumed absolute right of any state to 
sovereignty over its near waters. For historical and technical reasons 
this had been agreed to be a distance of three nautical miles. Beyond 
that was the domain of what were called the ‘high seas’ that, again 
for historical reasons, had come to be agreed as common to all and 
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over no part of which, at least in principle, any state exercised any 
sovereign authority. 
 
 The narrative need not detain us, but by the 1950s, in the post-war, 
decolonizing context of the epoch, and with the advance of 
technologies for exploiting the natural resources of sea and seabed, 
the initial European solution, already a matter of dispute for the best 
part of half a century, was widely held inadequate. Starting with the 
first convention in 1956, with its four subsidiary agreements in 1962, 
1964 (2) and 1966, and the inconclusive UNCLOS II of 1960, from 
1973-1982 160 states participated in agreeing UNCLOS III, which 
came into force on 16 November 1994. 
 
 The key principles agreed were that every littoral state has a 
geodetically fixed territorial sea baseline from which all other 
boundaries are determined. This baseline was the boundary between 
‘internal waters’ over which a state had absolute and unconditional 
sovereignty. To seaward of it extending twelve nautical miles offshore 
was a state’s ‘territorial waters’ over which it had sovereignty to 
regulate all activity, save for the right of any vessel of any other state 
retaining the rights of innocent passage and refuge when in distress.37 
For various reasons such a tightly defined and geographically 
constrained territorial sea was thought, and indeed legal argument 
suggests had always been thought unacceptably restrictive (Oda 
1962).  
 
 To respond to this disquiet, at this point recourse was had to the 
key concept we are considering in this monograph, namely that of a 
‘zone’. What is interesting here is the implicit distinction, frequently 
noted above, between something with clear boundaries – like a 
                                                          
37  Innocent passage excludes any resource use (like fishing), any polluting (like bilge water 
discharge), the use of weapons in any manner, spying, or any police or warlike activity such as, 
for example, ‘hot pursuit’. 
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‘parcel’, ‘lot’, or ‘territorial sea’ – and something that has a regulatory 
purpose but that is in some sense not so precise, though the nature 
of the imprecision seems often to be left usefully vague. 
 
 To solve the insufficiencies of territorial sea boundaries – initially 
largely over environmental (resource protection) and fiscal (anti-
smuggling) concerns – the concept of a ‘zone’ was turned to. One 
analysis of why argued that what a zone offered that a territorial sea 
did not was “legal gradation rather than confrontation” (Extavour 
1979, p.31 quoting Scelle 1943). In short, an area over which 
supervision could be exercised and rules set, though the question of 
effective enforcement remained and remains problematic (Oxman 
2006). Thus was introduced the ‘contiguous zone’, an additional 
extent of sea extending a further twelve nautical miles beyond the 
boundary of the territorial sea over which the possessing state has 
sovereign authority in respect of the supervision of conformity with 
its laws with respect customs and excise, taxation, immigration and 
pollution. 
 
 The issues that had in many ways occasioned the 
reconceptualization of sea areas, extending the authority of states 
further out to sea than had been the case since the days of the ‘closed 
seas’ (mares clausae) of the 16th century, were three. A concern about 
the effective enforcement of national laws on taxation and excise and 
an increasing awareness of humanity’s impact on the natural 
environment as a result of over-fishing and pollution that we have 
noted. The third, something of a latecomer, was an equally sharp 
awareness of the economic potential not just of seas close to state 
coasts, but the sea as whole. These potentials were the result on the 
one hand of improved fishing technologies like SONAR aided shoal 
location, factory ships, artificial fibre nets of enormous strength, etc., 
and on the other of the development of technologies allowing 
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exploitation of sub-seabed resources such as petroleum and natural 
gas.  
 
 As a result of these advances there was clear concern, especially in 
the latter case, that with pre-UNCLOS rules, the more technically 
advanced and richer developed world would be able to exploit the 
high seas commons unchecked, leading inevitably not merely to the 
further disadvantage of latecomers, but a real risk of a ‘tragedy of the 
commons’. As Oxman notes, the inevitable result was a further 
concession to the ‘territorial temptation’ (Oxman 2006) and, from the 
perspective of this monograph, a further recourse to the useful 
concept of a ‘zone’. 
 
 There was no appetite for a return to the mares clausae of the past, 
with the inevitable and adverse consequences for freedom of 
navigation and therefore of trade. So some other solution for the seas 
beyond states’ territorial seas and contiguous zones was needed. The 
way this was resolved in UNCLOS III was by the establishment of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that extended for 200 nautical miles 
from a territorial sea baseline or, though each case must be 
internationally agreed, to the edge of the continental shelf where that 
is greater than 200 nautical miles.  
 
 We have argued throughout this monograph that whatever the 
‘fuzziness’ of the concept of a ‘zone’ as opposed to the tight, 
Euclidean concept of a (territorial or property) boundary, it 
nonetheless necessarily rests on exactly the same survey data. Even a 
penumbra has a location – a locus of points, let us say, that represent 
the middle of the penumbral domain of uncertainty. It should 
therefore be of no surprise to discover the surveying consequences 
of UNCLOS III and its territorial sea baseline, territorial seas, 
contiguous zones and EEZs. As Hodgson and Smith noted when such 
a system was first mooted:  




“Approximately three hundred-thirty-one maritime boundaries will be required 
by universal claims to 200-mile zones. The United States alone will have to 
negotiate more than 10 percent of these maritime boundaries. Of the three-
hundred-thirty-one, fourteen would apply only to the territorial seas of states, 
that is, all intervening waters that are less than twenty-four nautical miles in 
breadth. The remaining three-hundred-seventeen boundaries involve, in whole 
or in part, extended jurisdiction to 200 miles.” (Hodgson and Smith 1979, p.426), 
 We can now return to the North Sea and some very simple data. 
The North Sea is 900 km (486 nm) long and 580 km (313 nm) wide. It 
is surrounded by the land masses and islands of seven littoral states: 
Norway, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and 
the United Kingdom. Given the basic rules of UNCLOS III, the size of 
the North Sea, the fact that it is rich in natural resources, both 
biological and mineral, and the ubiquity of Oxman’s ‘territorial 
temptation’, one might expect endless disputation. 
 This did not happen, save in a few relatively minor cases (Friedman 
1970, Grisel 1970, Klein 2004, p.257, Young, 1965), arguably much 
facilitated by the existence of the European Union. Instead the EEZ 
issues in the North Sea were treated as if the whole sea were a co-
development zone. The junctions of all the EEZs were agreed in terms 
of the principles of UNCLOS III. Indeed the last remaining dispute was 
only resolved in 2014. It was a minor one between the Netherlands 
and Germany, but is an example within an example of a co-
development zone occasioned by the growth of yet another use of 
offshore areas in an era of sustainable energy sources, offshore wind 
farms. 
 The problem started in 2010 when the German company EWE 
announced their intended construction of the €450 million Riffgat 
offshore wind farm. This involved thirty giant wind turbines spread 
over a sea area that Germany had concluded was entirely within its 
EEZ. However, there were unresolved issues with respect to the 
 Progress in Planning 
79 
 
conjunction of national borders and territorial sea baselines of the 
Netherlands and Germany, the latter being functions of the Dutch 
offshore island of Schiermonnikoog and the German offshore island 
of Borkum.  
 The disputes arose over the exact course of the River Ems, which 
forms the Netherlands/Germany border, an issue that had been a 
running problem since the 1960s. On the German interpretation of 
the river’s course the windfarm was entirely in German waters. On 
the Dutch interpretation 40% of it lay in Netherlands’ waters (Durr, 
2012). The dispute was resolved in 2014 in a remarkable example of 
zoning, in this case with Germany and the Netherlands agreeing that 
“the border will remain ambiguous and that both countries will be 
responsible for the area.” In fact this was an extension to seaward and 
final confirmation of a co-development approach to the Ems-Dollart 
estuary that had informed joint agreements on water management 
and nature conservation in internal waters, though never entirely 
trouble free, since the early 1960s. The German Foreign Minister 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier said the agreement was “a good result for 
the economy, for new wind farms and maritime interests.” (IBRU 
2014, Van der Welde in Brunet-Jailly 2015, vol.2, pp. 620-628).   
 It is clear co-development zoning is a viable solution to seemingly 
intractable EEZ problems when the ‘territorial temptation’ bites. 
However, it is also clear that any such solution depends both on good 
neighbourly relations and an acceptance that no one side’s claims can 
expect to ride roughshod over the claims of others. The default is the 
abandonment of grandiose claims based on highly suspect, indeed 
often spurious ancient history and the acceptance of the allocation of 
zones by UNCLOS III. This leaves only the relatively minor, small area 
tussles of the kind exemplified in the North Sea examples standing in 
need of resolution. The reasonable, co-development orientated 
acceptance implicit in the first allocation then stands as the starting 
 Progress in Planning 
80 
 
point for resolving the issues remaining. Figure 11 is the concept of 
co-development zoning. 
   
Figure 11 about here 
 
Caption for Figure 11: Co-development Zone 
 
Part 6: Discussion and conclusion 
 
The symphony of libertarian ideas like evolutionary planning and 
spontaneous planning cannot be performed in the absence of a stage 
laid on the foundation of the existence of real property, which has 
specific boundaries defining places.  The discussion herein shows that 
the state, in defining places for whatever ad hoc, contingent or 
teleological reason, inevitably involves these private places.  
 
 Our inquiry into the meaning of zoning began with an explanation 
as to why private property as places may be understood as primeval 
zones: the centres of domestic and economic activities.  Modern 
planning generally imposes by legislation new zones onto these 
private zones or lots, in an attempt to address environmental and 
other issues. Such issues are typically cross boundary, affect third 
parties and are understood to be incapable of avoidance by restrictive 
covenants.  This is the setting for raising a theoretically interesting 
question, informed by the Coase Theorem, of whether zoning by 
contract is a viable alternative to zoning imposed by law. Could it be 
put into practice on a large geographical scale for a modern urban 
settlement?   
 
 The metaphor we have in mind is the contrast between traffic flows 
at an intersection when the traffic lights are working and when they 
have broken down. In both cases the traffic continues flowing. But it 
may be an open question as to which state of affairs is the more cost 
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efficient for each vehicle taken as a single decision unit and as to 
which is the more efficient and effective response to traffic flow 
efficiency as a whole.  
 
 In our inquiry, the focus is on the neglected boundary nature of 
zoning. There is no direct equation implied between zoning at the lot 
or district and any higher jurisdictional level except purely at the level 
of understanding the idea of a boundary. All modern terrestrially 
demarcated areas have boundaries and the demarcations all depend 
upon a common vocabulary and battery of techniques and 
instrumentation to establish them. In that sense and in that sense 
only how planning zones are defined and established is the same as 
how the boundaries of states are defined and established. In a sense, 
given those commonalties, it is precisely the fact that any equation of 
higher level administrative boundaries and local/municipal zoning is 
neither obvious nor indisputable that is interesting. The logical 
grammar of a ‘boundary’ straddles terrestrially mappable entities 
that are conceptually distinct. 
 
 With that thought in mind, we turn to noting, in relation to zoning, 
that it cannot avoid the reality that private planning involves no less 
reference to property boundary lines than does public planning to 
zone boundaries, as in the Coase story of a land use conflict between 
a cattle rancher and a wheat farmer. Mapping of initial property 
boundaries is unavoidable in any such theoretical discussion. To 
explore our road junction and traffic lights metaphor, the edges of the 
roads, the lane dividers and the intersection layout are givens.  
 
 Our inquiry focusses on Coase’s 1960 paper as it has a particular 
spatial application, though the fact of boundary delimitation as a 
feature of zoning can stand on its own as a proposition. A couple of 
important questions informed by Coase’s theory of the firm (Coase 
1937) as an institutional mechanism for coordinating transactions 
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should be answered.  First, is it possible to have an organized 
society/economy without zoning?  Second, is it possible to have 
“public urban planning" without zoning? 38  The answers to both 
questions are provided generally in our proposition that zoning, clear 
or ambiguous, is a character of private property rights in land. A more 
general formulation is that zoning is a spatial character of all regimes 
of exclusive property rights. 
 As for the first question, we can assume we are not dealing with 
the radical libertarian’s atomistic world coordinated only by the 
“market”. Equally we must assume we are not considering an 
autarkic world. Nor is there any assumption of an absence of spatial 
specialization. It follows therefore that any organized 
society/economy, whether of a congeries of private properties (each 
owned by one citizen or legal person) or centrally state-planned (a 
collectively owned economy) certainly involves zoning.  Where the 
former might come to exhibit a zoning variant of what Hayek (1976, 
vol. 2, pp. 108–9) called ‘spontaneous order’, the latter he likened to 
a whole society as a single firm in which coordination is by means of 
Coasian directions to various state enterprises as production units 
and communes (Hayek, 1944). The latter’s units (subsidiaries) have 
zones as they occupy land under their jurisdiction. The former’s 
properties achieve zoning as an outcome of private treaty (planning 
by restrictive covenants). 
 As regards the second question, granted that zoning is part and 
parcel of exclusive property rights in land, if not also always the 
consequent of spatial specialization of land uses, public urban 
planning without zoning is impossible by definition. The scholars 
favouring zoning liberalization do not dispute zoning per se (leave 
alone destruction of the lot system) but advocate greater freedom 
                                                          
38 We owe these two questions to a reviewer.  
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for private arrangements in zoning.  As intimated in the preamble and 
the subsequent analysis, this arrangement (such as that practised in 
Houston) is, as sketched above, actually one of private rezoning, i.e., 
rearrangement of private property rights as those were initially 
allocated as “lots” to private bodies according to the first layout (the 
first zoning plan) as upon colonization or as emerged, in whatever 
way it did, from a long process of historical development.   
It should be noted that zoning not merely entails the existence of 
boundary delineations but involves boundary delineation connected 
with differentiated obligations and requirements for different 
exclusive areas introduced by the state by edict or by contract. As 
pointed out by a reviewer, some scholars (Siegan 1970) suggest that 
this planning by mutual consent without any particular specifications 
is not only possible, but also desirable. Others, notably Holcombe 
(2013) and Moroni (2012)39 suggest that it is both possible and also 
desirable to have only a form of (public) “self-regarding zoning” 
(concerning only public land) but not a form of “other-regarding 
zoning” (concerning private land)(Portugali 2012).  Boundary 
delineation is not the same as fully describing zoning, but zoning 
necessarily involves boundary delineation as its indelible birthmark. 
 In this connection in this monograph we have also highlighted the 
hitherto ignored historical dimension in planning studies, not least 
the substantial contribution of the surveyor, often a military officer, 
to the layout and planning of European colonies. They were 
instrumental in land grants to attract settlers to “new land”. In the 
process the territories of indigenous populations, often categorized 
as terrae nullius, were often deemed common land and hence could 
be appropriated at will by enclosure as “property”.   
 
                                                          
39 In Alexander et al (2012). 
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Table 2 about here 
 
Caption for Table 2: Zoning Scenarios and Policy Suggestions 
 
 History has as a result witnessed a complicated process of 
displacement of indigenous habitats. Allocated and surveyed private 
lots have often pushed them aside as forgotten zones. Such forgotten 
zones, as new property, thereby constituted the physical platform for 
more efficient development by private enterprise, subject first to a 
phase of surrender and re-grant in negotiation with the state. 
Eventually these developments in their turn become subject to zoning 
by legislation to cope with issues affecting third parties. Yet the 
question remains: might such issues, intelligible in terms of Coasian 
transaction cost reasoning, be also resolvable by Coasian solutions as 
propounded by libertarian thinkers? The answer is beyond the remit 
of this monograph. Nevertheless, some recommendations based on 
the concern for reducing transaction costs are listed in Table 2. 
Growth in value of land and advancement in surveying technology 
push up demand for “accurately delineated” property and other 
forms of zone boundaries. However, what constitutes “clearly defined” 
boundaries in specific situations remains a high transaction cost 
question that will continue to benefit lawyers, planners and surveyors 
because what constitutes “clarity” is affected by values and interests, 
leading to contests and disputes. This is one of the shades in the 
penumbra we mention in this monograph.  
 
 Hopefully, this monograph will awaken an interest of the student 
of planning to the existence and nature of the tension between 
accuracy and clarity/penumbrality in zone boundaries. The student 
must be cautioned that a Coasian discussion about exchange of rights 
has an implicit “transactionist” presumption that the domain for 
private negotiation or unilateral grants is of a given area and hence 
any trade is about the re-partitioning of the domain between parties. 
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Any conceptualization that involves the possibility and mode of an 
area expansion of the Coasian domain, depicted in Figure 12, is 
something for further thinking.       
 
Figure 12 about here 
 
Caption for Figure 12: Expansion of Coasian Negotiable Domain  
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Table 1: Zoning Scenarios and Their Transaction Cost, Informational & 
Innovative Dimensions 
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Table 2: Zoning Scenarios and Policy Suggestions 
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Figure 1A: Natural, Terrain Following Boundaries with Spatially 
Inexact Markers and with Eastern Boundary Indeterminate 
 
  







Figure 1B: The Same Bounded Territory with Superimposed, Surveyed 
Boundaries Rationalizing the Customary Boundaries and Removing 
the Indeterminacy of the Previous “Fuzzy” Eastern Boundary 
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Figure 2A: The Coase Theorem 
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Figure 2B: The Corollary of the Coase Theorem 
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Figure 4B: The Corollary of the Coase Theorem in Action 
(without determination of common boundary) 
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Figure 4C: The Corollary of the Coase Theorem in Action 
(with state/court determination of common boundary) 
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Figure 5B:  Conflict of Zoning (Forced Combination)  
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Figure 8: Zoning for Non-planning 
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Figure 10: Rights Conferring Zoning 
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Figure 12: Expansion of Coasian Negotiable Domain 
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